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BODY CAMERAS AND THE PATH TO 
REDEEM PRIVACY LAW* 
WOODROW HARTZOG** 
From a privacy perspective, the movement towards police body 
cameras seems ominous. The prospect of a surveillance device 
capturing massive amounts of data concerning people’s most 
vulnerable moments is daunting. These concerns are 
compounded by the fact that there is little consensus and few 
hard rules on how and for whom these systems should be built 
and used. But in many ways, this blank slate is a gift. Law and 
policy makers are not burdened by the weight of rules and 
technologies created in a different time for a different purpose. 
These surveillance and data technologies will be modern. Many 
of the risks posed by the systems will be novel as well. Our 
privacy rules must keep up. 
In this Article, I argue that police body cameras are an 
opportunity to chart a path past privacy law’s most vexing 
missteps and omissions. Specifically, lawmakers should avoid 
falling back on the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard. 
Instead, they should use body cameras to embrace more nuanced 
theories of privacy, such as trust and obscurity. Trust-based 
relationships can be used to counter the harshness of the third-
party doctrine. The value of obscurity reveals the misguided 
nature of the argument that there is “no privacy in public.” 
Law and policy makers can also better protect privacy by 
creating rules that address how body cameras and data 
technologies are designed in addition to how they are used. Since 
body-camera systems implicate every stage of the modern data 
lifecycle from collection to disclosure, they can serve as a useful 
model across industry and government. But if law and policy 
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makers hope to show how privacy rules can be improved, they 
must act quickly. The path to privacy law’s redemption will stay 
clear for only so long. 
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Body-worn cameras on every police officer in America are 
understandably seen as a serious threat to privacy. People have deep 
concerns about the way in which this potentially pervasive and 
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powerful surveillance infrastructure is implemented and regulated.1 
The prospect of being watched all the time, especially in our most 
vulnerable moments, is daunting.2 So is the risk that comes from the 
colossal amount of data that will be created, stored, processed, and 
shared through the use of body camera systems.3 
Much of this concern stems from the fact that, until relatively 
recently, there were few specific rules for how body cameras should 
be built, used, or how the data they collected should be treated.4 This 
left police departments, often in conjunction with third-party vendors, 
to come up with their own rules.5 Unsurprisingly, the rules we have 
now, which include everything from state statutes and municipal 
ordinances to department policies and contracts with vendors, are 
inconsistent and sporadic. It seems that there is little consensus for 
key questions such as when the cameras will run and who will be able 
to tell when they are on; how long footage is kept and who can see it; 
how footage is secured; and whether biometrics can be used.6 
In fact, the one thing that seems clear from the body-worn 
camera debate is that with so many different players and interests 
involved, it is hard to agree on anything.7 Lawmakers and advocates 
 
 1. See Bryce Clayton Newell, Collateral Visibility: A Socio-Legal Study of Police 
Body Camera Adoption, Privacy, and Public Disclosure in Washington State, 92 IND. L.J. 
1329, 1139 (2017). 
 2. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1808 
(2015); Newell, supra note 1, at 1136−37; Katie Farden, Note, Recording a New Frontier in 
Evidence-Gathering: Police Body-Worn Cameras and Privacy Doctrines in Washington 
State, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 271, 276 (2016); Erik Nielsen, Comment, Fourth 
Amendment Implications of Police-Worn Body Cameras, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 115, 134 
(2016). People use several different terms to describe this technology, including “body-
worn cameras” and “body cameras.” The terms will be used synonymously in this article. 
 3. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Beyond Surveillance: Data Control and Body Cameras, 14 
SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 133, 133−36 (2016), https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php
/surveillance-and-society/article/view/cdebate4/bc4 [https://perma.cc/36PT-EBZZ]. 
 4. See id. at 133. 
 5. See generally Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology 
Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 101 (2017) (“The relationships 
between surveillance technology vendors and police departments show the increasing 
degree to which private companies can guide, shape, and limit what the public police 
do.”). 
 6. See Alexandra Mateescu, Alex Rosenblat & danah boyd, Police Body-Worn 
Cameras 2, 16–19 (Feb. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.datasociety.net/pubs
/dcr/PoliceBodyWornCameras.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJF4-FBBS]. 
 7. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN, 
POLICE BODY WORN CAMERAS: A POLICY SCORECARD (2017), 
https://www.bwcscorecard.org/ [https://perma.cc/GSV7-9VEK], for a useful reference 
comparing the different body camera policies on criteria such as policy available, officer 
discretion, personal privacy, officer review, footage retention, footage misuse, footage 
access, and biometric use. 
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of body cameras use purported foundational values such as 
“accountability” and “transparency” in such a vague way that the 
specific purposes of the cameras are not even clear.8 Are body 
cameras meant to provide evidence for when force is used? Or 
perhaps they are meant to more generally encourage good behavior 
by reminding people they are being watched? Or are there other 
goals for body cameras? Should body cameras primarily benefit the 
subjects of police interaction, the police officers themselves, the 
public, or all of the above? Which values are paramount in body-
camera systems: accountability, transparency, or privacy? And what 
do we even mean by those concepts? Privacy, in particular, is spacious 
and could mean a host of things.9 How police departments and 
vendors answer those questions will determine both how effective and 
how harmful police body-worn cameras can be.10 
But amidst the chaos lies opportunity. The relatively blank slate 
for body-worn cameras that is creating so much risk is also an 
opportunity to take a fresh new approach to the rules of surveillance, 
data protection, and privacy in public records. States, cities, and 
police departments need not cling to the entrenched and awkward 
rules out of inertia. Due process and reasonable care can be 
implemented in many different ways.11  
Most importantly, those creating rules for body cameras have the 
opportunity to avoid the broken parts of privacy law that have 
confounded courts, lawmakers, and officials for years. For example, 
 
 8. See Caren Myers Morrison, Body Camera Obscura: The Semiotics of Police Video, 
54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 791, 795 (2017); Kami C. Simmons, Body-Mounted Police Cameras: 
A Primer on Police Accountability vs. Privacy, 58 HOW. L.J. 881, 884−87 (2015) 
(identifying possible body camera utilities as identifying the use of excessive, deterring 
police misconduct and promoting officer safety, force, and use as a training tool to correct 
structural problems within police departments.); Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn 
Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1378 (2018) (explaining that there has been a “laundry list 
of advantages” for body-worn cameras); Mateescu, et al., supra note 6, at 16−19 
(discussing potential issues with body-worn cameras depending on the manner in which 
policy allows them to be used); danah boyd & Alex Rosenblat, It’s Not Too Late to Get 
Body Cameras Right, ATLANTIC (May 1, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology
/archive/2015/05/its-not-too-late-to-get-body-cameras-right/393257/ [https://perma.cc
/2VQR-WLNN]. 
 9. See Simmons, supra note 8, at 889–90 (showing examples of the concerns relating 
to privacy and who benefits from the use of body cameras). 
 10. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN, 
supra note 7 (noting that police departments in various cities addressed privacy in 
different ways while some police departments did not address privacy at all). 
 11. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF BODY-WORN 
CAMERA BY LAW ENFORCEMENT 19–21 (2016), https://constitutionproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/BodyCamerasRptOnline.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JVA-4V35] 
(addressing issues of due process and chain of custody). 
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there is a growing discomfort with the idea that there is no privacy in 
public or in information shared with third parties.12 Lawmakers have 
too often ignored the design of information technologies. They too 
often conceive of public records as exclusively binary, where the only 
choices seem to be either to keep it hidden or to release it to the 
world, with no restrictions.13 People too often use publicly accessible 
information to exploit and harass others or expose them in harmful 
and unjustified ways.14 Entrenched privacy regimes have to grapple 
with these problems that have been created by old and narrow 
conceptualizations of privacy and ineffective strategies to protect it. 
Body-worn camera rules do not have to repeat the same mistakes. 
In this Article, I argue body cameras are an opportunity for law 
and policy makers to create frameworks that do not repeat privacy 
law’s most vexing missteps and omissions. In doing so, law and policy 
makers can chart the path for better surveillance and data rules in 
other contexts. The path to privacy law’s redemption has both a 
theoretical and practical component. Policy makers can use body 
cameras to embrace more nuanced theories of privacy in law. They 
can also use body cameras to better protect privacy in practice by 
embracing a holistic approach to body-camera systems that include 
rules regarding how body camera and data technologies are built, in 
addition to how they are used. A sound theoretical and practical 
framework for body cameras can serve as a model for how to better 
balance notions of privacy with competing values like government 
transparency and free speech in other contexts involving surveillance 
and data protection. Also, a new framework can show how to move 
beyond ill-fitting theories of privacy that either gradually erode 
protection for people or awkwardly group information and contexts 
into “public” or “private” categories. 
My goal for this Article is modest within the entire body camera 
debate, as I am concerned mainly with how these technologies affect 
privacy. There are critical questions regarding free speech, 
government accountability, racial justice and freedom from bias, 
procedural fairness, and evidentiary concerns that lawmakers, judges, 
and police departments must answer, in addition to data and 
 
 12. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 13. See infra Section I.B.3. 
 14. See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL 
THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3) (on file with 
the North Carolina Law Review) (providing examples of harmful effects of personal 
information being used in harmful ways); Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: 
Privacy, Public Records, and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2002). 
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surveillance issues.15 By focusing only on privacy, I do not mean to 
diminish the importance of government accountability, equality, due 
process, and press freedom. In fact, my hope is that the framework 
proposed in this Article would help to better balance privacy among 
the other values implicated by body cameras. Nor do I directly 
address the efficacy of body-worn cameras for their stated goals, 
 
 15. See Kami N. Chavis, Body-Worn Cameras: Exploring the Unintentional 
Consequences of Technological Advances and Ensuring a Role for Community 
Consultation, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 985, 988–89 (2016); Mary D. Fan, Justice 
Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 898 
(2017) (“[T]here is often a difference between the legally relevant truth and the depiction 
captured on video. Care must be taken therefore to apply the proper perceptual yardsticks 
and reserve interpretive questions for the appropriate fact-finders.”); Mary D. Fan, 
Hacking Qualified Immunity: Camera Power and Civil Rights Settlements, 8 ALA. C.R. & 
C.L.L. REV. 51, 52 (2017); David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head 
Cams) as Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 357, 359–60 (2010) (“What is more, this technology can serve numerous other 
functions that police will find not just useful, but welcome. This versatility makes the idea 
one of the most promising possibilities for assuring police accountability and compliance 
with the law to come along in many years.” (footnote omitted)); Iesha S. Nunes, “Hands 
Up, Don’t Shoot”: Police Misconduct and the Need for Body Cameras, 67 FLA. L. REV. 
1811, 1815 (2015) (“[B]ody cameras will not only help to increase accountability on behalf 
of law enforcement, but will also increase the public’s trust in those whose duty it is to 
protect and serve.”); Matthew R. Segal & Carol Rose, Race, Technology, and Policing, 59 
BOS. B.J. lxii, lxii (2015) (“Police departments in Massachusetts and around the nation 
face heightened scrutiny about racial bias in their stop-and-frisk and use-of-force 
procedures.”); Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to 
Record the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1566 (2016) (“With videotaped interrogations, for 
instance, individuals viewing a video of a confession are more likely to believe the police 
are being coercive if the video is shot from the point of view of the person being 
interrogated, pointing at a police officer. When the video is pointed at the suspect, in 
contrast, viewers are more likely to judge the confession voluntary. Something similar 
occurs with videos of police conduct: when shot from the point of view of the police 
officer, as a body camera will do, the ‘camera perspective bias’ will cause the viewer to 
sympathize with the officer’s actions more than they would with a video taken from a 
neutral angle or from the perspective of the person engaging with the police officer.” 
(footnote omitted)); Howard M. Wasserman, Epilogue: Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 
92 WASH. U. L. REV. 845, 848 (2015) (“Even as recent events confirm that body cameras 
(and the resulting video) are not the infallible solution to police misconduct or to disputes 
over police-citizen encounters, they reaffirm cameras as worthwhile public policy offering 
some help in understanding and resolving conflicts between police and their 
communities.”); Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 831, 833 (2015) [hereinafter Wasserman, Moral Panics] (“While body cameras are 
a good idea and police departments should be encouraged and supported in using them, it 
is nevertheless important not to see them as a magic bullet. The public discussion needs 
less absolute rhetoric and more open recognition of the limitations of this technology.”); 
V. Noah Gimbel, Note, Body Cameras and Criminal Discovery, 104 Geo. L.J. 1581, 
1584−85 (2016); Kyle J. Maury, Note, Police Body-Worn Camera Policy: Balancing the 
Tension Between Privacy and Public Access in State Laws, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 
481 (2016); Roseanna Sommers, Note, Will Putting Cameras on Police Reduce 
Polarization?, 125 YALE L.J. 1304, 1312 (2016). 
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though the evidence on their efficacy seems tentative and 
inconclusive, at best.16 My goal in this Article is ambitious in one 
sense, however. Body-camera regimes could inspire future 
surveillance and data rules, amendments, and opinions that involve 
other technologies and practices such as biometrics, genomic data, 
drones, and artificial intelligence. Sustainable and harnessed body-
camera regimes could serve as the model, or at least inspiration, for 
other technologies that sense, store, process, and share information. 
My argument proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I argue that the 
relatively blank slate for police body cameras presents an opportunity 
for law and policy makers to embrace new privacy notions and 
strategies that move beyond some of the vexing and misguided 
concepts entrenched in other areas of surveillance, data protection, 
and public records law. I briefly review the impetus for police body 
cameras, the varying interests at stake, and the public and 
governmental push to adopt use of body cameras. Then, I review the 
various laws and policies that currently govern body cameras to 
demonstrate that there is little consensus on both first-order 
principles, as well as the specifics about what can be collected, how it 
can be stored and processed, and who can access it. I end this Part by 
making the case that body cameras are a promising technology to use 
to chart new trajectories for privacy law because they implicate a wide 
range of privacy-risky activity like surveillance, data processing, and 
public dissemination. Also, because body-camera rules are developed 
from the ground up instead of at the federal level, these rules can be 
calibrated through experimentation and, ultimately, serve as a firmer 
foundation for stable change.17 
In Part II, I address how body cameras are an opportunity to 
improve how privacy is theorized within the law. I argue that to 
provide a more nuanced theory of privacy in law, policymakers 
should abandon the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test for body 
camera rules. The test is broken and unsalvageable. Lawmakers, 
 
 16. Barak Ariel, Police Body Cameras in Large Police Departments, 106 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 729, 729 (2016); Wasserman, Moral Panics, supra note 15, at 837−40 (“We 
can only speculate whether recording will deter bad behavior and incentivize good 
behavior by police and the public. The technology and its use by actual police are too new 
to know its true effects.	.	.	. [V]ideo does not ‘speak for itself.’”); Mayor Muriel Bowser, 
Randomized Controlled Trial Metropolitan Police Dep’t Body-Worn Camera Program, 
LAB@D.C., http://bwc.thelab.dc.gov/#home [https://perma.cc/H8NB-MGCX]. 
 17. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN, 
supra note 7 (showing that state and local governments are implementing rules and 
policies for body cameras in support of the argument that states are experimenting with 
different rules). 
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courts, officers, and citizens have been tied into knots trying to divine 
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in particular 
contexts.18 The test has given birth to two of the most misguided 
notions in all of privacy law—the idea that there is no privacy in 
“public” or in things shared with third parties. Instead, policymakers 
should create body camera rules that are focused on protecting more 
nuanced notions of privacy such as trust and obscurity. Trust is a 
more accurate description of the value to be protected with data 
storage and processing rules. Trust is also a good construct to guide 
vendor recipients of body camera data. Obscurity, the notion that we 
or our data are unlikely to be found or observed in most contexts, is a 
much more accurate description of the value threatened by 
surveillance, data collection, and increased data accessibility.19 
In Part III, I address how body cameras are an opportunity to 
show how privacy law can be more pliable, holistic, and calibrated to 
serve multiple values and mitigate abuses of power. I argue that the 
introduction of body-camera laws provide an opportune time to make 
a few practical adjustments to address privacy law’s design gap.20 The 
way that digital and surveillance technologies and systems are built 
will shape how they are used. Too often, privacy law focuses 
exclusively on the activities of the surveiller, data collector, or data 
recipient.21 Rules for how surveillance technologies and data systems 
are built and used are also important for body camera systems. I 
conclude this article by proposing a more holistic framework for 
states, cities, and departments. This framework combines rules for 
data practices with rules for the design of technologies. It also 
embraces a more nuanced conceptualization of privacy. It will help 
policymakers better respect people’s obscurity, trust, and autonomy 
while balancing the goals of government accountability and freedom 
of the press. When the concept of privacy is more specifically 
articulated, it can be better balanced with clearly defined goals 
relating to public records and speech while avoiding the conflicts 
 
 18. See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511–
12 (2010) (“The reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to a contentious 
jurisprudence that is riddled with inconsistency and incoherence.”). 
 19. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 20. See generally HARTZOG, supra note 14 (explaining there is a general lack of focus 
on design when it comes to privacy policies). But see Ari Ezra Waldman, A Statistical 
Analysis of Privacy Policy Design, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 
103–05), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3141351 [https://perma.cc
/A239-SCFK]; Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
74, 78–79 (2018). 
 21. See HARTZOG, supra note 14 (manuscript at 4). 
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inherent in trying to articulate what is a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy.” 
If body cameras are to serve as a model for privacy law, 
policymakers must act soon. Body-camera laws are already being 
passed.22 The window of opportunity to redeem privacy law is closing. 
If lawmakers do not get these rules right, we will be installing yet 
another omni-surveillance and personal data infrastructure based on 
notions of privacy that are increasingly myopic and untenable. 
I.  BODY CAMERAS ARE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW HOW TO FIX 
PRIVACY LAW 
Body cameras have been around for a little while, but they are 
not yet fully entrenched. In this Part, I will describe why body 
cameras present a window of opportunity for policymakers to show 
how to bypass privacy law’s most common mistakes. While many 
police departments have created policies regarding the use of body 
cameras, not all states have passed formal legislation specifically 
addressing the policy of body-worn cameras.23 Even states that have 
passed body camera-specific legislation are still working on how to 
implement it, and the window for change remains open.24 Among 
those bodies that have passed rules, many important issues regarding 
things like access and the use of biometrics remain unresolved and in 
need of attention.25 With a little imagination and a lot of hard work 
and political capital, body-camera law could serve as a model for how 
to improve information privacy law across the board. But lawmakers 
must act quickly and decisively. The window for change will only be 
open for a short time. Once states pass rules and law enforcement 
departments implement the systems, the concrete hardens. 
A. The Rush to Implement Body Cameras with No Clear Plan 
Body-worn cameras are not entirely new. The idea to use small 
surveillance cameras mounted on the bodies of police officers has 
 
 22. See Stoughton, supra note 8, at 1380 (explaining that there is a “laundry list of 
advantages” for body-worn cameras and addressing the rapid rate at which police body 
cameras are being implemented throughout the United States). 
 23. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN, 
supra note 7 (noting that a few cities in some states have put in place body-camera rules 
and -policies).  
 24. See generally Mateescu et al., supra note 6 (noting that there are areas of body 
camera-policy which still need to be addressed even in cities where there are policies 
regarding body cameras). 
 25. Id. 
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been the subject of public debate at least as early as the 2000s.26 Dash 
cams have been around in some form since the 1960s and have been 
in common use since the 1990s.27 However, when Michael Brown was 
shot and killed by Ferguson, Missouri, police officer Darren Wilson 
under controversial circumstances, the public outcry for policy body 
cameras intensified.28 The demand to record police interactions with 
the public also increased following the deaths of African American 
men Philando Castile, Freddie Grey, Samuel DuBose, Sean Bell, Eric 
Garner, Alton Sterling, and others, all of whom died following police 
encounters.29 
Remarkably, there is a convergence of interest in seeking to 
implement police body cameras. Governments, law enforcement 
organizations, police officers unions, civil rights organizations, the 
general public, and certainly the body-camera equipment and data 
industry all, to some degree, support the implementation of body-
worn cameras for police officers.30 Unfortunately, there is little clear 
consensus on what the rules for body cameras should be or how they 
should be implemented. Body-camera laws vary dramatically from 
city to city and state to state with respect to officer discretion over 
camera activation, footage review rights for officers, privacy, 
biometric use, and footage retention, use, and accessibility.31 Even 
model policies proposed by unions and civil rights organizations are 
 
 26. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 15, at 360–61 (discussing the use of body-worn 
cameras in the United Kingdom and the United States as early as 2005). 
 27. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE ON 
MODERN POLICING 5 (2004), https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/IACPIn-CarCameraReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y9YD-HCPY]. 
 28. See Adam Lidgett, How Body Camera Manufacturers Are Cashing in on Michael 
Brown’s Ferguson Death, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/how-
body-camera-manufacturers-are-cashing-michael-browns-ferguson-death-2123677 
[https://perma.cc/W3QM-68W4]; Josh Sanburn, The One Battle Michael Brown’s Family 
Will Win, TIME (Nov. 26, 2014), http://time.com/3606376/police-cameras-ferguson-
evidence/ [https://perma.cc/KT5U-MUGW] (“In the weeks after Brown’s death, numerous 
law-enforcement agencies around the U.S. began experimenting with body cameras. 
Anaheim, Calif.; Denver; Miami Beach; Washington, D.C.; and even Ferguson have all 
begun outfitting officers with cameras or announced plans to start. The movement 
Brown’s family called for the night Wilson was cleared has actually been growing since the 
day their son was killed.”). 
 29. See Daniel Funke & Tina Susman, From Ferguson to Baton Rouge: Deaths of 
Black Men and Women at the Hands of Police, L.A. TIMES (July 12, 2016, 3:45 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-police-deaths-20160707-snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc
/X5GM-E4TU)]. 
 30. Mateescu et al., supra note 6, at 1, 7. 
 31. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN, 
supra note 7. 
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different from each other along similar fault lines.32 The policies 
developed by local police departments also vary, to the extent that 
they are even accessible.33 And this is to say nothing of the different 
kinds of contracts between governments and third-party body-camera 
equipment and data vendors. These contracts shape the influence that 
private industry has over the surveillance technologies and the data 
they create.34 
The general ambiguity and uncertain goals for police body 
cameras likely play a role in its collective appeal to the relevant 
parties. It is not clear if the cameras are meant to change behavior, 
provide evidence of interactions, or increase public trust (or all of 
those things).35 So for now, body cameras can be all things to all 
people. But, if body cameras are to be safe and sustainable, specific 
first-order principles should be identified and agreed upon. Sooner or 
later, concrete rules will need to be articulated in those jurisdictions 
that have yet to regulate the use of body cameras. This includes rules 
designed to protect the privacy of those surveilled and implicated by 
surveillance. 
B. The Window of Opportunity to Change Privacy Law 
Given how long courts and lawmakers have been wrestling with 
privacy issues, you might be tempted to think they would have it 
worked out by now. Sadly, you would be wrong. Despite over one 
hundred years of attempting to create a sound body of privacy rules 
and jurisprudence, courts, lawmakers, and the general public remain 
confused about how to best protect the protean concept of privacy.36 
 
 32. Compare A Model Act for Regulating the Use of Wearable Body Cameras by Law 
Enforcement, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/model-act-regulating-use-wearable-
body-cameras-law-enforcement?redirect=model-act-regulating-use-wearable-body-cameras-
law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/R7DA-4TQD] (“A law enforcement officer who is 
wearing a body camera shall notify the subject(s) of the recording that they are being 
recorded by a body camera as close to the inception of the encounter as is reasonably 
possible.”), with “Model” Body-Camera Policy, LAB. REL. INFO. SYS. (Sept. 12, 2014), 
https://lris.com/2014/09/12/model-body-camera-policy/ [http://perma.cc/5DMG-KSGS] 
(follow “LRIS” hyperlink; then follow “PDF Version” hyperlink) (“Officers have no 
obligation to stop recording in response to a citizen’s request if the recording is pursuant 
to an investigation, arrest, lawful search, or the circumstances clearly dictate that 
continued recording is necessary. However, officers .	.	. may evaluate the situation and .	.	. 
honor the citizen’s request.”). 
 33. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN, 
supra note 7. 
 34. For more information on these contracts, see Joh, supra note 5. 
 35. See Stoughton, supra note 8, at 1380–1400 (discussing views and potential benefits 
of body cameras). 
 36. See infra Part II. 
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Admittedly, creating rules around a concept as complex as privacy is 
a daunting task. For starters, the concept defies definition.37 Is privacy 
about secrecy, intimacy, control, identity, or dignity? Or something 
else entirely? Regardless of how it is defined, it is often in tension 
with other values, such as free speech, safety, accountability, and 
innovation. Sometimes, privacy means rules about what other people 
can disclose. Sometimes, privacy means law enforcement might have 
difficulty obtaining information it needs to keep people safe. Privacy 
is also an astonishingly cross-cutting concept within legal systems, 
having relevance in the law of torts, contracts, consumer protection, 
constitutional free expression, self-incrimination and due process 
rights, evidence, equity, and many others.38 Statutes that address 
government search and seizure, public health, electronic surveillance, 
data protection, public records, and many more all accommodate 
some notion of privacy. 
The problem is that courts and lawmakers do not seem to be 
getting any closer to a workable consensus. The debate over what 
constitutes a privacy “harm” is still wide open.39 Courts demand 
“concrete” injury, but even that remains elusive.40 Is increased risk an 
injury in itself? Anxiety over information misuse?41 Regulatory 
agencies like the FTC are accused of overreach in their failure to 
properly and publicly identify privacy harms and balance them with 
privacy benefits.42 Courts and lawmakers are struggling to articulate 
 
 37. Cf. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 479–82 
(2006) (discussing the present lack of consensus surrounding the definition of “privacy” 
and its associated body of laws and suggesting a taxonomy to aid in its development). 
 38. See, e.g., id. at 483; Marcy E. Peek, Information Privacy and Corporate Power: 
Towards a Re-Imagination of Information Privacy Law, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 127, 129 
(2006). 
 39. See Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L. J. 1131, 1133 (2010) 
(offering an account of privacy harm “delineating [its] specific boundaries”); Robert L. 
Rabin, Perspectives on Privacy, Data Security, and Tort Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 313, 
324−28 (2017). 
 40. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548−50 (2016) (ruling that because 
the Ninth Circuit “failed to fully appreciate the distinction between concreteness and 
particularization, its standing analysis was incomplete”); Rabin, supra note 39, at 327–28. 
 41. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data 
Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 754 (2018) (“Most courts consider plaintiffs’ fear, 
anxiety, and psychic distress about their increased risk of identity theft and other abuses 
too remote to warrant recognition.”). 
 42. See Angelique Carson, LabMD Argues ‘Matter of Principle’ in FTC Data- Security 
Appeal, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS (IAAP) (June 26, 2017), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/11th-circuit-hears-arguments-in-labmd-v-ftc-appeal/ [https://perma.cc
/GVA4-FBV5]; Lesley Fair, Third Circuit Rules in FTC v Wyndham Case, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog
/2015/08/third-circuit-rules-ftc-v-wyndham-case [https://perma.cc/F9XR-9MTG]. 
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the boundaries of surveillance for new technologies like cellphone-
tower interception devices and license plate reader technologies, 
existing technologies like GPS trackers for cars, and even common 
technologies like the smartphone.43 
Unsurprisingly, this breadth and ambiguity has resulted in a body 
of privacy law in the United States that is loosely grouped to 
communally serve some conceptualization of privacy. Despite this 
vague common purpose, most areas of privacy law in the U.S. are 
siloed and developed organically from the bottom-up, rather than a 
unified set of principles producing rules that flow from the top-down. 
Not all frameworks deal with a full range of privacy problems. Some 
target surveillance.44 Others target problems with data processing.45 
Still others deal with the disclosure of private information.46 Holistic 
frameworks that address the lifecycle of information are limited in 
scope. And there is no requirement that these rules be consistent with 
each other. 
This balkanization of privacy law in the U.S. has made change an 
atomized process. No one area has been able to serve as a perfect 
model for another.47 Some pockets of privacy law seem strangely 
ossified. The original privacy torts—intrusion upon seclusion, 
disclosure of privacy facts, misappropriation of name or likeness, and 
depicting another in a false light—have failed to develop much since 
their inception.48 They are limited by the First Amendment and 
specific harm requirements in addition to a general skepticism by 
courts.49 Notwithstanding a chorus of voices in industry and civil 
society begging for reform, the last time Congress seriously revisited 
the U.S. electronic surveillance laws was in the mid-1980s. When the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act was passed in 1986, 
computers were outrageously expensive and the computing practices 
and business models that shaped the rules were quite different than 
 
 43. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484−85 (2014); United States v. Jones, 
565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012); Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880, 887 (6th Cir. 2016), 
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017). 
 44. See, e.g., Thomas B. Kearns, Note, Technology and the Right to Privacy: The 
Convergence of Surveillance and Information Privacy Concerns, 7 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 975, 977–78 (1999). 
 45. See, e.g., Joseph A. Tomain, Online Privacy & The First Amendment: An Opt-In 
Approach to Data Processing, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2014). 
 46. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 37, at 530–35. 
 47. See id. at 483 (explaining that the “vast and complex” nature of American privacy 
law necessitates a “new taxonomy to address privacy violations for contemporary times”). 
 48. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed 
Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1189–90 (2010). 
 49. Id. at 1901–02. 
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they are now.50 Even the new data protection rules that have been 
passed in the last forty years like the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (“GLBA”) follow the same general set of principles, the fair 
information practices, or “FIPs.”51 These basic data rules have not 
changed much since they were conceived in the 1970s. 
This ossification has stuck privacy law into a pattern of 
perpetuating its deficiencies. The persistent mistakes surrounding the 
conceptualization of privacy seem most visible. Courts and lawmakers 
keep defining privacy in narrow ways, such as secrecy, ignoring 
privacy in social contexts and new potential misuses of privacy 
information. For example, there are few rules that meaningfully 
mitigate the disparate impact that surveillance and data practices can 
have on vulnerable and minority communities.52 Privacy law is often 
treated as separate from anti-competition law.53 It is too often silent 
on how technologies are used to manipulate people in subtle and 
adversarial ways, or how companies employ powerful algorithms in 
opaque ways with little accountability.54 
Courts and lawmakers in privacy disputes cling to binary maxims 
like “no privacy in public” or “no privacy in information shared with 
third parties” instead of engaging with more nuanced notions of 
privacy that require difficult balances with speech, security, and 
 
 50. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§	2510−2522 (2016)); Rainey Reitman, Deep 
Dive: Updating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/12/deep-dive-updating-electronic-communications
-privacy-act [https://perma.cc/988Y-XV2X]; Brad Smith, Modern Digital Data Laws That 




 51. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 
42 U.S.C.); Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 16 
U.S.C.); Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 
MD. L. REV. 952, 953−54 (2017). 
 52. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. 
L. REV. 671, 677 (2016); Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 
785, 785 (2015); Andrew P. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 
109, 115–16 (2017). 
 53. See MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA & COMPETITION 
POLICY 55 (2016). 
 54. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS 
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 19−20, 103 (2015); Danielle Keats Citron, 
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008). 
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autonomy, and often unsatisfying compromises and line-drawing 
exercises.55 Bright-line rules like the “third-party doctrine” are 
justiciable and easy to work with, but as I will discuss in Part II, they 
are too often under inclusive of privacy interests. Sometimes privacy 
harms are individually small but widely dispersed, like subtle forms of 
manipulation using personal information to target your weak points 
or the collective loss of massive data breaches. 
In short, privacy law seems stuck. It is still grappling with old 
problems even as new ones are on the way. Inertia might explain 
some of this state of affairs. It is hard to change entrenched systems. 
It is even harder, and often unwise, to propose something entirely 
new. Established rules can reflect custom, wisdom, and feasibility. 
However, body cameras provide a unique opportunity to create at 
least a workable model for change. This technology implicates a 
broad spectrum of privacy threats along the entirety of the 
information lifecycle and requires a framework that addresses them 
all, from surveillance and data collection to data storage and use to 
data access and dissemination. Body cameras implicate problems that 
are addressed in electronic surveillance law, data and consumer 
protection law, public records rules, and free expression doctrine. 
Because police body-camera rules can be created locally, they can 
develop in an organic and stable way through dispersed 
experimentation and revision. 
1.  Surveillance 
The primary function of policy body cameras is surveillance. 
danah boyd and Alex Rosenblat wrote, “[s]urveillance has an 
economic and social price. Advocates [of body cameras] hope that the 
psychological cost of being watched will dissuade officers from abuse, 
but members of these communities will face these costs too.”56 They 
noted that “[p]olice-worn body cams do not face the police. They face 
members of the community—everyday people doing everyday things. 
The goal may be to capture criminal activities by civilians and by 
police, but to get there, these cameras will film people walking down 
the street minding their business.”57 Body cameras can capture people 
at their most vulnerable. They can also reveal things through 
persistent surveillance that people do not anticipate, even in public. 
Even the mere knowledge of surveillance can result in chilling effects 
 
 55. See infra Section II.B.  
 56. boyd & Rosenblat, supra note 8.  
 57. Id. 
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and harms to autonomy.58 The dangers of surveillance have been long 
studied and articulated by scholars.59 The worst burden of 
surveillance will be felt by the most vulnerable and underrepresented 
communities.60 
In addition to the specific surveillance harms against individuals, 
the push for body cameras represents an even more ominous threat of 
the slow but persistent creep to expand surveillance systems into all 
areas of our life. Once these systems are built, it is incredibly difficult 
to curtail and mitigate their influence over us. The mere existence of 
cameras will increase their demand. For example, in the aftermath of 
the police shooting of Justine Damond at her home in Minnesota, 
many publicly asked why the officers’ body cameras had not been 
activated.61 The mere presence of cameras will likely lead to questions 
like “if you have the cameras, why don’t you use them?”62 The 
absence of footage could be seen as evidence of wrongdoing,63 even if 
that presumption is not justified. The result is a one-way ratchet that 
will steadily demand and facilitate more surveillance in the absence of 
clear, justified, and feasible rules that limit when a camera is to be on 
capturing video and audio. 
2.  Data Protection 
Body cameras also implicate the concerns about how 
organizations collect, store, use, and share personal data. Elizabeth 
 
 58. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935, 
1945 (2013). 
 59. Id. at 1934–36. See generally GARY T. MARX, WINDOWS INTO THE SOUL: 
SURVEILLANCE AND SOCIETY IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY (2016) (addressing 
concerns such as the abuse of surveillance by “offering a framework that more 
systematically defines surveillance questions with respect to structure, organization, 
practice, function, and process” (footnote omitted)).  
 60. boyd & Rosenblat, supra note 8 (“Those who will be surveilled by body-worn 
cameras are already the most marginalized members of society, and they already 
experience a disproportionate amount of surveillance from other law-enforcement 
cameras. This is particularly true for people who lack private residences to retreat to, 
either because they are homeless or are resident[s] in public housing, where the police 
have greater freedom to enter over a resident’s objection.”). 
 61. Gordon Severson, Expert: Body Cameras Should Have Recorded Australian 
Woman’s Shooting, USA TODAY (July 19, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/nation-now/2017/07/19/body-cameras-should-have-recorded-justine-damond-shooting/491064001/ 
[https://perma.cc/5CS6-6LGV]. 
 62. Wasserman, Moral Panics, supra note 15, at 842 (“As police cameras become 
more pervasive, it becomes impossible to escape demands—from courts, litigants, juries, 
citizens, the media, and civilian review boards—that cameras always will be used, that 
video always will be available.”). 
 63. Id. (stating that people will demand the use of body cameras and “the absence of 
video evidence is itself suspicious and suggestive of misconduct”). 
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Joh wrote that the data generated by body cameras present just as 
much of a challenge as their surveillance capabilities.64 She argues, 
“Police body camera policies must address not only concerns about 
surveillance, but also data control. The absence of clear data control 
policies will result in confusion, both for the police and the public, 
about who has access to see, share, and delete data produced from 
body-worn cameras.”65 According to Joh, “without strong 
presumptions in favor of sharing the data with the public, the reform, 
accountability, and legitimacy potential of body worn cameras will go 
unfulfilled.”66 However, making data public in a safe and sustainable 
way is challenging. 
Data harms are wide-ranging and pervasive.67 Personal 
information can reveal secrets and confidences, but it can also be 
misused against the data subject and others. Our data reveals what 
makes us tick and can be used to manipulate us. For example, Ryan 
Calo has observed that personal information can be leveraged for the 
“mass production of bias,” “disclosure ratcheting,” and “means-based 
targeting.”68 He calls this a kind of “digital market manipulation.”69 
Personal data also presents systemic threats. Data powers 
automated technology and machine learning. It is used to power 
decision-making algorithms that can reinforce human biases70 and 
have disparate impacts on minority and vulnerable populations. In 
previous research, I have written that “[d]ecisions that used to be 
made by humans based upon a small amount of information are now 
going to be made by automated software based upon exabytes of 
data.”71 Danielle Citron has said that computers are increasingly the 
primary decision-makers in systems that have significant 
consequences for humans.72 Automated decision-making systems now 
leverage personal data when terminating “individuals’ Medicaid, food 
 
 64. Joh, supra note 3, at 133. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1133 (2011) 
(categorizing the wide range of date harms into objective and subjective). 
 68. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1007, 1012, 
1015 (2014). 
 69. Id. at 1051. 
 70. Hartzog, supra note 51, at 971. 
 71. Id. at 970. An exabyte is 1 billion gigabytes. See Daniel Price, Surprising Facts and 
Stats About the Big Data Industry, CLOUDTWEAKS (Mar. 17, 2015), 
http://cloudtweaks.com/2015/03/surprising-facts-and-stats-about-the-big-data-industry/ 
[https://perma.cc/5EC3-J8WM]. 
 72. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 
1252 (2008). 
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stamp, and other welfare benefits,”73 as well as excluding people from 
air travel.74 Citron observed that “[c]omputer programs identify 
parents believed to owe child support and instruct state agencies to 
file collection proceedings against those individuals. Voters are 
purged from the rolls without notice, and small businesses are 
deemed ineligible for federal contracts.”75 Therefore, data collection 
and processing implicates serious due process issues,76 disparate 
impact on minority and other vulnerable communities,77 and invasions 
of privacy and stigmatization due to the predictive power of data 
analytics.78 
Further, soon it might not even be possible to opt out of 
automated decision-making. Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale 
have warned that we are at risk of becoming what they call a “scored 
society,” whereby people are assigned numbers similar to credit 
scores, but for everything.79 Industry is also working to deploy 
algorithmic decision making to rank, file, and sort us in nearly every 
way imaginable, including many that people have yet to realize.80 Our 
subjugation to algorithms has already started. China aims to “give 
every citizen a score based on behavior such as spending habits, 
turnstile violations[,] and filial piety, which can blacklist citizens from 
loans, jobs, [and] air travel.”81 The sustainability, safety, and efficacy 
 
 73. Id. at 1252, 1256, 1268–73 (discussing the issuance of hundreds of thousands of 
incorrect Medicaid, food stamp, and welfare eligibility determinations across numerous 
state programs as an example of a failed automated system). 
 74. Id. at 1252, 1274–75 (discussing erroneous classifications, in which innocent 
individuals are mistakenly identified as terrorists, on the “No Fly” list). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See generally id. (discussing the threat data collection and processing, specifically 
in the context of automated systems, poses to due process). 
 77. See generally Barocas & Selbst, supra note 52 (positing that data mining can 
perpetuate discriminatory behavior, often by picking out proxy variables for protected 
classes). 
 78. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
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 79. Danielle K. Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for 
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2–4, 8 (2014); see also PASQUALE, supra note 
54, at 191–92 (2015); Tal Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1376 (2014) (identifying discrimination as an additional concern 
related to the emergence of a scored society). 
 80. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 79, at 3–4, 8 (citing the secrecy of the scoring 
systems and metrics as a major criticism to the emergence of a scored society). 
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for Everything, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2016, 11:46 AM), 
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of these systems depends upon whether we have rules for how they 
are built and used.82 
Kate Crawford and Ryan Calo have argued that “[a]utonomous 
systems are already deployed in our most crucial social institutions, 
from hospitals to courtrooms. Yet there are no agreed methods to 
assess the sustained effects of such applications on human 
populations.”83 Body cameras are a great opportunity to create rules 
that understand how data and automation will impact people, culture, 
and politics, because these technologies will likely seek to leverage 
algorithms and automated decision-making, yet their rules and 
policies remain nimble and dispersed. There is room for 
experimenting with rules without disrupting the whole.84 
3.  Public Records and Public Disclosure 
Finally, body cameras raise incredibly important questions about 
what constitutes a public record, who gets to access those records and 
under what circumstances, how they access them, and what can be 
done with them upon disclosure.85 Public records laws are critical for 
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government accountability and journalism in the public interest. 
Generally, public records laws dictate the type of records created or 
stored by government entities that will be made available to anyone 
that requests them and the circumstances under which they will be 
released or withheld.86 But the concept of public records also has 
blurry edges. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a public record as “[a] 
record that a governmental unit is required by law to keep.”87 One of 
the central questions in the law of public records concerns which 
public records should be ultimately released—and which should not—
based on certain policy considerations, including privacy.88 
Two major privacy issues related to public records arise when 
they are aggregated into massive datasets that dramatically reduce the 
search costs for the curious and when they include information that is 
already “public” or involves “public surveillance.”89 First, people’s 
names, ages, addresses, and similar regularly disclosed information 
might not be seen as “private” in the traditional sense of the word but 
can still be used in adverse ways against them.90 Courts and 
lawmakers regularly consider much of this information to be public 
and thus not subject to a public records privacy exemption, perhaps 
because we expose and share this information with others all the time. 
The same holds true for the release of surveillance that occurred “in 
public.” There is a litany of cases that hold surveillance in public 
spaces and in “plain view” does not infringe a reasonable expectation 
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(discussing the public records laws of several states and the federal government). 
 87. Public Record, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 88. See David S. Ardia & Anne Klinefelter, Privacy and Court Records: An Empirical 
Study, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1807, 1807, 1813 (2015); Grayson Barber, Personal 
Information in Government Records: Protecting the Public Interest in Privacy, 25 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 63, 63 (2006); Amanda Conley et. al., Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice 
in the Transition to Online Court Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 
772, 774 (2012); Jane E. Kirtley, “Misguided in Principle and Unworkable in Practice”: It Is 
Time to Discard the Reporters Committee Doctrine of Practical Obscurity (and Its Evil 
Twin, the Right to Be Forgotten), 20 COMM. L. & POL’Y 91, 109 (2015); Samuel A. Terilli & 
Sigman L. Splichal, Public Access to Autopsy and Death-Scene Photographs: Relational 
Privacy, Public Records and Avoidable Collisions, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 313, 322 (2005). 
 89. See Solove, supra note 14, at 1138; see also Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 88, at 
1807–08; Conley et. al., supra note 88, at 777 (“[C]ourts have an obligation to rewrite rules 
governing the creation of, and access to, public court records in light of substantive 
changes that online access augurs.”). 
 90. See Solove, supra note 14, at 1138. 
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of privacy.91 Second, another concern with such a dramatic increase in 
public records is the great potential and incentives for companies to 
exploit data for their own personal gain, rather than for public 
accountability purposes.92 Will body-camera vendors be able to sell or 
export the data it captures and stores?93 Or might this data somehow 
end up in the hands of unscrupulous businesses that post 
embarrassing information about people gleaned from public records, 
like mugshots, then charge a high fee to have that information taken 
down?94 
Police body-camera rules should grapple with the privacy 
implications of exabytes95 of surveillance data being made available as 
public records. Many of them already do. But questions remain. 
When should data be deleted? In what format should footage be 
made available and how soon? Should police-body camera footage 
and data be somehow redacted or obfuscated? Should access be 
granted only subject to certain restrictions on further use or 
dissemination? Public records laws have existed for a long time. 
Lawmakers do not often have the occasion or impetus to wholesale 
 
 91. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–137 (1990); California v. 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) 
(“The Fourth Amendment simply does not require police traveling in the public airways at 
1,000 feet to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.” 
(footnote omitted)); United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240, 242 (4th Cir. 1994); Daily Times 
Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 476 (Ala. 1964) (noting that there was no 
expectation of privacy at a fair but permitting a tort suit by a woman who was 
photographed at a county fair with her skirt blown up over her head, relying in part on the 
fact that the photographer was lying in wait to catch the woman in an embarrassing 
situation); Creel v. I.C.E. & Assocs., Inc., 771 N.E.2d 1276, 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); 
Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in A Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 1, 6, 18 (2007) (“Courts have generally held that anything capable of being viewed 
from a ‘public place’ does not fall within the privacy torts’ protective umbrella.	.	.	. Under 
the Restatement, an individual cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in any 
public place. More formally, any activity that is visible to the public eye—whether that eye 
is human or mechanical—is not actionable under the public disclosure tort. For example, 
courts have found that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a restaurant, in a 
church service, or at a county fair.”) (footnotes omitted)). 
 92. See Margaret B. Kwoka, Inside FOIA, Inc., 126 YALE L.J. F. 265, 266 (2016); 
Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1361, 1377 (2016) [hereinafter 
Kwoka, FOIA, Inc.]. 
 93. See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and 
Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 959 (2004); Solove, supra note 14, at 1138. 
 94. See, e.g., David Segal, Mugged by a Mugshot, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/mugged-by-a-mug-shot-online.html [https://perma.cc
/ZX5J-GQA7 (dark archive)]. 
 95. “A unit of information equal to one quintillion (1018) or, strictly, 260 bytes.” 
Exabyte, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
exabyte [https://perma.cc/K3TD-T7HS]. 
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reimagine a public records framework that better balances 
government transparency and accountability with more nuanced 
conceptualizations of privacy. But body cameras are just such an 
opportunity. 
*     *     * 
Because body-camera systems leverage sensors, algorithms, and 
data in ways that implicate privacy, government transparency, and 
free speech, they are an opportunity to modify surveillance, data, and 
public records rules all at once and stake out new ground at the 
municipal and state levels. This kind of ground-up federalism has the 
benefit of flexibility and more stable foundation over time. For 
example, Paul Schwartz has argued that states can be “laboratories 
for innovations in information privacy law.”96 Regarding drones—
another surveillance technology that necessitates new rules—Margot 
Kaminski has written that the tension between privacy and First 
Amendment freedom is better resolved by the states than an attempt 
by the federal government to resolve the tension in “one fell 
swoop.”97 According to Kaminski, federal legislation is expensive, 
burdensome to enact, and more likely to be overturned by courts. She 
argues, “[r]ather than attempt to get federal legislation right on the 
first try, and risk having it rejected by First-Amendment-protective 
courts, we should allow states to run through less costly iterations.”98 
Kaminski’s argument resonates with body cameras as well. 
Given the state’s interest and providence regarding policing, 
body-camera law is less likely to be preempted by federal legislation 
than privacy rules for drones, which have caught the attention of 
federal regulators like the Federal Aviation Administration 
(“FAA”).99 Cities and states have an increasingly important role to 
play in privacy law. Body-camera law is a good example of what Ira 
Rubinstein calls “privacy localism,” a focus on municipal and state 
privacy rules. Rubinstein argues that privacy localism is important 
because “privacy issues are highly salient to cities” in light of big data 
policing and the “smart city” movement, that cities have significant 
flexibility to create privacy rules due to the lack of privacy legislation 
at the state and federal level, and cities have historically been more 
willing than state governments or the federal government to try out 
 
 96. Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 916 (2009). 
 97. Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They 
Carry, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 57, 64 (2013). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/ [https://perma.cc/J9JK-99UN]. 
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innovative new privacy protections.100 This Article echoes 
Rubinstein’s calls for privacy localism, particularly with respect to 
body-worn cameras. 
To meaningfully address the faults of privacy law, lawmakers and 
courts must act quickly. Cities and states are already passing or 
considering legislation. Policies are already getting adopted and the 
cameras, systems, and storage software are already being built. But if 
law and policy makers seize the moment and explicitly move beyond 
traditional notions of the data protection and the fatally flawed 
“reasonable expectations of privacy” test, they can start a revolution. 
II.  REFINING THEORY: GET RID OF THE REASONABLE 
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY TEST 
Lawmakers and courts should not rely on the concept of a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” as a threshold for body camera 
privacy rules. This concept is entrenched, so it is easy to see why 
lawmakers might look to it when crafting rules for body cameras. It 
determines the scope of protections under the Fourth Amendment 
and other aspects of privacy law, including the privacy torts, 
surveillance statutes, and public records law.101 The test for 
determining the boundaries of surveillance and data practices was 
popularized in the influential case of Katz v. United States.102 
Ostensibly, in order to determine whether surveillance or data 
practices are allowable, courts and lawmakers are to ask whether an 
individual has an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and also 
whether society recognizes that expectation as reasonable.103 In 
theory, this test fits alongside the longstanding tradition of 
 
 100. Ira Rubinstein, Privacy Localism 6–7 (N.Y.U. Sch. Of L., Working Paper No. 18-
18, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124697 [https://perma.cc
/V7NF-TVBM]. 
 101. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967); see also Solove, supra 
note 18, at 1512–13. 
 102. 389 U.S. at 353.  
 103. See id. at 352 (stating that Katz, seeking to exclude the uninvited ear, is entitled to 
assume that his conversation will be private when he enters the telephone booth). But see 
Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 113, 114 (2015) (“This Essay argues that Katz is only a one-step test. 
Subjective expectations are irrelevant. A majority of courts that apply Katz do not even 
mention the subjective inquiry; when it is mentioned, it is usually not applied; and when it 
is applied, it makes no difference to outcomes.”). 
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“reasonableness” thresholds within the law.104 In practice it has not 
worked out that well. 
This test has far outlived its usefulness. The concept of privacy is 
far too vague and difficult to define for it to be deployed as a term of 
art. Additionally, the reasonableness test too often defaults into 
descriptive accounts of both people and society’s actual expectations 
of secrecy, rather than normative accounts of which personal 
boundaries should be protected.105 
So far, several cities and states have already made the mistake of 
relying upon reasonable expectations of privacy for body-camera 
rules. According to research conducted by The Leadership 
Conference & Upturn, as of August 2016, of the major cities they 
studied that have enacted body-camera policies, many either prohibit 
or mitigate recording or regulate data use and access in contexts 
where individuals have a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”106 For 
example, in Philadelphia police body cameras cannot be used or 
activated “[i]n places where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists 
 
 104. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness in and out of Negligence Law, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2131, 2146 (2015) (surveying the various uses of “reasonableness” in the law 
and noting that it is the standard for Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases).  
 105. See Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. 
REV. 139, 149 (2016). 
 106. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN, 
supra note 7. Boston uses the concept of “reasonable expectation of privacy” to limit 
officers’ discretion when choosing to record but then provides a longer list of 
considerations for officers in privacy-sensitive contexts without actually deploying the 
specific language and concept of “reasonable expectations”: 
BWC officers should be mindful of locations where recording may be considered 
insensitive, inappropriate, or may be prohibited by privacy policies. Such locations 
may include locker rooms, places of worship, religious ceremonies, certain 
locations in hospitals or clinics, law offices, day care facilities, etc. At such 
locations, at the officer’s discretion and based on the circumstances, BWCs may be 
turned off. The officer may consider the option to divert the BWC away from any 
subjects and record only audio, if appropriate. When exercising discretion in such 
situations, the decision whether to stop recording, divert the BWC, or record only 
audio should generally be based on the following BWC Discretionary Recording 
Considerations: the extent to which the officer observes activities or circumstances 
of a sensitive or private nature; the presence of individuals who are not the subject 
of the officer-civilian interaction; the presence of people who appear to be minors; 
any request by a civilian to stop recording; and the extent to which absence of 
BWC recording will affect the investigation. 
BOS. POLICE DEP’T, POLICE COMM’R’S SPECIAL ORDER NO. 16-023: BODY-WORN 
CAMERA PILOT PROGRAM POLICY §	2.4 (2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/static
/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/57a0d592725e25a1855d9143/1470158226345/Body_Camera.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DQ7D-TUQT]. 
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(i.e., locker rooms, dressing rooms or restrooms).”107 Sometimes these 
policies employ the “reasonable expectations” language as a “catch 
all” provision in combination with other, more specific rules that 
dictate when the body camera should not be used.108 Other times, the 
“reasonable expectations” language is used to determine when 
officers should exercise discretion when recording; when surveillance 
subjects should be notified that they are being recorded; and, in some 
cities, when surveillance subjects will be given the option to request 
the camera be turned off.109 
A number of body-camera policies even permit the officer to 
record in certain circumstances where there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Atlanta has rules that state law enforcement 
officers may use body-worn cameras to “record the activities that 
 
 107. PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVE 4.21: BODY-WORN CAMERAS §	4-C (2017), 
http://www.phillypolice.com/assets/directives/D4.21-BodyWornCameras.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7UX7-XWVG]. 
 108. See, e.g., CLEVELAND DIV. OF POLICE, GEN. POLICE ORDER NO. 3.2.20: 
WEARABLE CAMERA SYSTEM (WCS) §	V (2015), https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/oh
_clevelandpd_wcs_policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NCU-U9YK]. Cleveland’s policy states 
that, unless otherwise required, the camera shall not be used to capture the following: 
D. Protected health information and treatment when requested by the patient, or 
on-scene Emergency Medical Service or Division of Fire personnel. 
E. Gratuitous captured media (i.e. effects of extreme violence or injury, exposed 
genitalia or other erogenous areas, etc.). 
F. Any place where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy (i.e. dressing 
rooms, restrooms, etc.). 
G. Images of confidential informants or undercover members, unless requested by 
the undercover member, their supervisor, or commanding member. 
H. Conversations of citizens and/or members (i.e. administrative duties, court, 
community meetings, etc.). 
Id. at §	V(D)–(H). 
 109. See, e.g., CITY OF FERGUSON, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE, GEN. ORDER 
NO. 481.00, §	481.3(3) (2016), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/policies/2016-02-26
%20Ferguson%20-%20BWC%20Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/AD43-LS4C] (“In 
exercising this discretion, officers should be aware of and sensitive to civilians’ reasonable 
privacy expectations.”); FAIRFAX CTY. POLICE DEP’T, DRAFT MODEL POLICY FOR 
BODY WORN CAMERA §	IX (2017), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/2016/policies
/2015-05-17%20Fairfax%20County%20-%20BWC%20Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6B5-
BAWQ] (“When officers are recording persons in locations where the person should have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy (i.e. home, business office not open to the public, 
restroom, locker room, etc.), the officer should whenever practical .	.	. inform the 
person(s) that they are being recorded.”); MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVE NO. 
16-18, REVISION TO THE DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL, NEW POLICY: CHAPTER 33 - PART 1 
- BODY-WORN CAMERA SYSTEM §	VII(H) (2016), https://www.miamidade.gov/police
/library/bwc-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/D423-E7NZ] (“In locations where victims have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, such as a residence, hospital, or place of worship, an 
officer may honor a victim’s request to turn off the BWC unless the recording is being 
made pursuant to an arrest or search of the residence or the individuals.”).  
96 N.C. L. REV. 1257 (2018) 
1282 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
occur in places where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy if 
they occur in the presence of the law enforcement officer.”110 However, 
Atlanta’s body-camera policy protects the privacy of recorded 
individuals by exempting recordings “used by law enforcement in 
places where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy from 
disclosure” under the Georgia Open Records Act.111 Aurora, 
Colorado, provides that “[t]he body-worn camera will not be 
activated in public places where a reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists, such as locker rooms, changing rooms, or restrooms unless the 
activation is for the purpose of official law enforcement activity.”112 
Dallas follows the trend of privacy law in refusing to recognize any 
privacy in “public,” as its policy states: “Officers are not required to 
obtain consent from a private person when in a public place or in a 
location where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.”113 
 
 110. ATLANTA POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL: STANDARD OPERATING 
PROCEDURE NO. 3133, BODY WORN CAMERAS (BWC) §	4.3.1 (2017), 
http://www.atlantapd.org/Home/ShowDocument?id=954 [https://perma.cc/6KYJ-QS6G]. 
However, the policy does prohibit recording in dressing rooms, locker rooms and 
restrooms, as well as “exposed genitals or other sexually sensitive areas.” Id. at §	4.4.1. 
 111. Id. at §	4.9.1. 
 112. AURORA POLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVES MANUAL §	16.4.4 (rev. 2017), 
https://www.auroragov.org/common/pages/DisplayFile.aspx?itemId=10473413 [https://perma.cc
/BK6S-9J9L]. Chicago’s policy states that “[t]he BWC will not be used to record .	.	. in 
locations where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, such as dressing rooms or 
restrooms, unless required for capturing evidence.” CHI. POLICE DEP’T, SPECIAL ORDER 
S03-14 §	V.H (2016) (emphasis added), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives
/data/a7a57b38-151f3872-56415-1f38-89ce6c22d026d090.pdf?ownapi=1 [https://perma.cc
/2TCF-SWAE]; see also CINCINNATI POLICE DEP’T, PROCEDURE MANUAL, 
PROCEDURE NO. 12.540 BODY WORN CAMERA SYSTEM §	A.5.c (2017), 
https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/assets/File/Procedures/12540.pdf [https://perma.cc
/Y8ZZ-NPSY] (“Officers will not use the BWC to record the following .	.	. [i]n any place 
where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g., restroom, locker room) except 
during an active incident (e.g., foot pursuit that leads into a locker room)”); DENVER 
POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS MANUAL §	119.04(3)(b)(4) (2018), https://www.denvergov.org
/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/720/documents/OperationsManual/OMSBook/OM_Book.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XV77-2HGG] (“The BWC will not be activated in places where a 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists (such as detox, medical, and/or healthcare 
facilities, locker rooms or restrooms, etc.) unless the activation is for the purpose of 
official law enforcement activity.”); MEMPHIS POLICE DEP’T, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 
INFORMATION AND UPDATES §	V.C. (2016), http://www.memphispolice.org/pdf/BWC.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZQZ6-QYTC] (“The [BWC] will not be activated in places where a 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists, such as locker rooms or restrooms, unless the 
activation is for the purpose of official law enforcement activity such as a call for service. 
When possible, every precaution shall be taken to respect the dignity of the victim by 
avoiding recording videos of persons who are nude or when sensitive areas are exposed. If 
this is unavoidable, the video can later be redacted.”). 
 113. DALLAS POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER 332.00 BODY WORN CAMERAS 
§	332.04(A)(4) (2015), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/policies/2015-08-31%20Dallas
%20BWC%20Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQC9-8UYW]. This policy also provides:  
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The states that have proposed or enacted legislation around body 
cameras use the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy in a 
similar way. The statute in Illinois requires notice of surveillance be 
given in contexts where people have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.114 In determining whether to release video footage, Missouri 
requires courts consider “[w]hether .	.	. video .	.	. contains information 
.	.	. reasonably likely to disclose private matters in which the public 
has no legitimate concern; bring shame or humiliation to a person .	.	. ; 
was taken in place where a person .	.	. has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”115 Louisiana’s law prohibits the release of body-camera data 
that violates a reasonable expectation of privacy.116 
In this Part, I will join the chorus of scholars that argue that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test is broken and unsalvageable. I 
argue in favor of rules that favor more specific privacy-related values 
such as trust, obscurity, and autonomy, with an emphasis on process, 
relationships, and risk. 
A. The Test is Broken and Unsalvageable 
The problem with the reasonable expectations of privacy test is 
that it is too vague and too descriptive. Scholars have long protested 
the reasonable expectations text.117 Daniel Solove wrote, “The 
 
While in public areas, officers are not required to advise a subject that they are 
recording their interaction unless the subject specifically asks if they are being 
recorded, at which point the officer will inform the subject that they are being 
recorded. When in a private residence in an official capacity, officers are not 
required to advise the resident they are recording. The officer is not prohibited 
from but encouraged to advise the citizen of the recording if doing so if it would 
better serve the handling of the incident. 
Id. at §	332.04(A)(5)–(6). 
 114. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 706/10-20(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.). 
 115. MO. REV. STAT. §	610.100(5)(3)(b)–(d) (West, Westlaw through 2017 First Reg. 
Sess. and First and Second Extraordinary Sessions of the 99th Gen. Assembly). 
 116. LA. STAT. ANN. § 44:3(A)(8) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Second Extraordinary 
Sess.)).  
 117. Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment 
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002); Solove, supra 
note 18, at 1511–12 (citing Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the 
“Legitimate Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1321 (1981)); Richard G. 
Wilkins, Defining the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”: An Emerging Tripartite 
Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (1987). But see Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of 
Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506–07 (2007) (“Scholars and 
students of Fourth Amendment law find the current approach frustrating because the 
courts routinely mix and match the four models .	.	.	. But appearances can be deceiving. 
What at first looks like conceptual confusion turns out to be a much-needed range of 
approaches.”). 
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reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to a contentious 
jurisprudence that is riddled with inconsistency and incoherence. 
Debates rage over whether particular government information 
gathering activities invade ‘privacy.’”118 He was not always a critic. 
Solove wrote, “For a long time, I believed that with the appropriate 
understanding of privacy—one that is well-adapted to modern 
technology, nimble and nuanced, forward-looking and 
sophisticated—Fourth Amendment jurisprudence could be 
rehabilitated. I now realize I was wrong.”119 According to Solove, the 
focus on reasonable expectations of privacy is misguided with respect 
to the Fourth Amendment. A focus on privacy invasions often is only 
tenuously related to problems caused by government surveillance and 
investigation. Solove argues that a focus on privacy “also bears little 
relation to whether it is best to have judicial oversight of law 
enforcement activity, what that oversight should consist of, how much 
limitation we want to impose on various government information 
gathering activities, and how we should guard against abuses of 
power.”120 Other critics have labeled the law surrounding the Fourth 
Amendment as “confusing, illogical, chaotic, and inconsistent.”121 
The reasonable expectations test is also too often just a proxy for 
identifying people or society’s subjective expectations instead of rules 
for mitigating surveillance and data practices as exercises of power.122 
Pre-existing perceptions of exposure can be used to justify invasive 
surveillance practices. Scholars have noted that there is not enough of 
 
 118. Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 
IND. L. J. 549, 554–55 (1990) (“[W]e should return to the privacy test intended by 
[Justices] Stewart and Harlan and to the underlying values that motivated it.”); Brian J. 
Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model of Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 
MINN. L. REV. 583, 642 (1989) (“[T]he Court’s current [F]ourth [A]mendment analysis is 
based on simplistic and logically incorrect theories of public exposure.”); Solove, supra 
note 18, at 1511–12. 
 119. Solove, supra note 18, at 1512. 
 120. Id. at 1513. 
 121. See Tokson, supra note 105, at 144 (citing Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, 
The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical 
Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1149–50 (1998); Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth 
Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1321 
(1981); and Donald R.C. Pongrace, Stereotypification of the Fourth Amendment’s 
Public/Private Distinction: An Opportunity for Clarity, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1191, 1208 
(1985)). 
 122. See Solove, supra note 18, at 1521 (“From the way it is formulated, the test 
purports to be an empirical metric of societal views on privacy.”); cf. Tokson, supra note 
105, at 144 (noting that the Fourth Amendment test is “well-defined”). But see Matthew 
B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity, 84 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1747 (2017) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment test is not circular). 
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a moral floor for the privacy test.123 Solove wrote that it is not 
people’s expectations that should matter, but rather what they desire 
regardless of their expectations. He wrote, “We look to the law not 
just to preserve the status quo, but to change it and to shape society 
into what we want it to be.”124 Mathew Tokson proposed looking 
exclusively to positive law or having courts engaging in direct 
normative balancing as an alternative to relying upon expectations 
that might not contain an ethical infrastructure.125 The lack of moral 
floor allows unchallenged privacy encroachments to serve as the 
justification that people can no longer expect privacy. Even worse, it 
ignores the need for rules even when surveillance and data practices 
might not threaten certain conceptualizations of privacy, such as 
secrecy.126 
I agree with the critics, perhaps for slightly different reasons than 
some. While many find fault in the application of the test, my critique 
lies with the fatal inclusion of the concept of privacy within the text 
itself. What is “privacy,” anyway? It has no set meaning, which 
creates real problems. Since no one knows what privacy really means, 
any rules that are built around the malleable general concept of 
privacy, instead of more specific concepts like confidentiality, secrecy, 
or obscurity, are destined to be ill-fitting and exploited. When courts 
and lawmakers allow privacy to be subject to definition at every turn, 
 
 123. See Solove, supra note 18, at 1524 (citing Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on 
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974)) (noting that Supreme Court 
pronouncements themselves affect society’s future expectations of privacy and that “the 
government could condition the populace into expecting less privacy. For example, as 
Professor Anthony Amsterdam has observed, the government could diminish expectations 
of privacy by announcing on television each night that we could all be subject to electronic 
surveillance.”). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Tokson explains that under a positive law regime, the “absence of a law or 
common law tort prohibiting some government information-gathering activity would 
definitively establish that the activity was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. The 
reverse would also apply—when a government investigative action violated positive law, it 
would constitute a per se Fourth Amendment search.” Tokson, supra note 105, at 190 
(footnote omitted). Alternatively, “[a] direct normative balancing test would find a Fourth 
Amendment search when the harms to citizens of allowing police to engage in a certain 
type of surveillance without a warrant outweigh the benefits to society via improved law 
enforcement.” Id. at 196. 
 126. Solove, supra note 18, at 1525 (“But even measuring desires fails to address an 
overarching problem: we might want to regulate government information gathering even 
when it does not violate privacy. The problem with a doctrinal test based on privacy is that 
it ensnares courts and commentators into a debate over the meaning of privacy and takes 
the focus away from the full range of problems the Fourth Amendment needs to address. 
Practical consequences are ignored in an analytic approach that is nearly blind to the 
results.”). 
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those seeking to surveil and collect data will consistently argue for the 
most narrow interpretation possible. Without a more specific value or 
goal to guide how privacy should be conceptualized, they will win. It 
is time to get rid of the reasonable expectations test throughout 
privacy law, and police body cameras are an ideal place to chart more 
protective, accurate, and sustainable benchmarks. 
B. Embrace More Specific Notions of Privacy 
Every time law and policy makers invoke the concept of privacy 
to define people’s expectations or obligations, they should clarify 
what they mean by that word. Privacy can be conceptualized many 
different ways.127 How it is conceptualized will dictate which values it 
ultimately serves or ignores. For example, if privacy is conceptualized 
only as secrecy, information shared with groups of people will be 
excluded, and the values of trust and obscurity will not be served. 
Prioritizing values can help determine how the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test is administered with respect to body 
cameras. For example, if privacy rules are meant to facilitate the 
value of intimacy, then prohibitions on filming nude people or in 
people’s bedrooms make sense and might be sufficient. If privacy 
rules are meant to facilitate solitude, then privacy rules might be 
interpreted in similar ways to prevent filming when people thought 
they were isolated. But intimacy and solitude are not the only ways to 
conceptualize privacy. Data-protection regimes and identity rights 
seek to protect privacy by providing people control over their 
personal information and preserving their dignity. Rules of evidence 
and fiduciary responsibility seem to advance privacy interests by 
preserving confidentiality. When the concept of “privacy” is used in 
law without any meaningful clarification, courts and lawmakers have 
no clear guidance on which conceptualization to use and which 
privacy values to prioritize. 
Too often, the reasonable expectation of privacy test merely acts 
as a proxy for “expectation of secrecy.” There are, of course, good 
reasons not to film in places where we expect near total secrecy, 
seclusion, and discretion, such as bathrooms and dressing rooms. But 
the problem is when the entirety of privacy is framed in this way.128 
Consider Milwaukee’s body-camera policy, which states “[body worn-
 
 127. See generally Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087 
(2002) (evaluating different conceptions of privacy). 
 128. See DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 6 (2008); Daniel Solove, “I’ve 
Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
745, 746 (2007); Solove, supra note 127, at 1089. 
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cameras] will not be activated in a place where a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists, such as dressing rooms, locker rooms 
and restrooms.”129 This policy frames privacy as secrecy—something 
not known or seen or not meant to be known or seen by others.130 But 
what about every other aspect of our lives? Can we only expect 
privacy when we are naked? 
The better approach to the reasonable expectations of privacy 
test is to build rules that serve more specific values than the near-
generic conceptualization of privacy. Specifically, I recommend 
relying upon the concepts of trust and obscurity to mitigate two of the 
biggest weaknesses of the “reasonable expectations” test: the 
misguided third-party doctrine and the fallacy that there is “no 
privacy in public.” 
1.  Trust Protects Relationships 
People place their trust in others every day. We should formulate 
rules requiring recipients of information to be discreet, protective, 
honest, and—most importantly—loyal. This is particularly true as an 
ethos for third-party vendors of body cameras and the data they 
create. 
Professor Neil Richards and I have argued that modern privacy 
law is incomplete because, from its inception, it has failed to account 
for the importance of trust.131 We adopted the definition of trust as 
the willingness to make one vulnerable to the actions of others, which 
emphasizes the role of power within relationships.132 
Trust is an essential component of healthy relationships and 
healthy societies. Although different disciplines define trust in various 
 
 129. MILWAUKEE POLICE DEP’T., GEN. ORD. NO. 2015-42: STD. OP. PROC. 747—
BODY WORN CAMERAS (BWCS) §	747.25.E.1 (2015), https://www.rcfp.org/bodycam
_policies/WI/MilwaukeeWI_BWC_policy_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QVF-64F8]. 
 130. Secret, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. 1993). 
 131. For a discussion of the importance of trust and its relation to privacy, see 
generally ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN 
INFORMATION AGE (forthcoming 2018); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s 
Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L.J. 1180 (2017) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, 
Privacy’s Trust Gap]; Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in 
Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Taking 
Trust Seriously]; Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Trusting Big Data Research, 66 
DEPAUL L. REV. 579 (2017) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Trusting Big Data 
Research]. 
 132. See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap, supra note 131, at 1213; 
Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 131, at 433. 
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ways,133 it is useful to think of trust as a “state of mind that enables its 
possessor to be willing to make herself vulnerable to another—that is, 
to rely on another despite a positive risk that the other will act in a 
way that can harm the truster.”134 Trust allows cooperation with other 
people despite the fact that exposing ourselves enables them to harm 
us. In the context of information relationships, trust means the 
willingness to become vulnerable to a person or organization by 
disclosing personal information. 
Every disclosure of personal information in the modern age 
leaves the discloser vulnerable in some way, if only incrementally. As 
a result, every information relationship involves some degree of trust, 
or willingness to become vulnerable.135 This is true even if that trust is 
not a conscious one. Trust is a key component in the relationship 
between citizens and police, particularly with respect to the data that 
is created from body cameras. In cities and states where consent is 
used to justify body-camera use, that consent is likely going to be 
based on trust that the officer is going to protect what is recorded and 
keep it from getting into the wrong hands or used in a way that 
violates the people’s privacy. 
So, how can privacy rules for body cameras further trust? One 
way is to break the concept down into its component parts. Richards 
and I articulate the various tenets of trust as discretion, honesty, 
protection, and loyalty.136 We have argued that those who we entrust 
with our information and well-being have “a duty to avoid 
unreasonable and dangerous self-dealing.”137 
These four concepts—discretion, honesty, protection, and 
loyalty—can guide rules that support trust. They are not new. They 
are foundations of one of the most established legal concepts 
involving trust in relationships—the law of fiduciaries.138 The “central 
goal of fiduciary law is to protect against the exploitation of a 
vulnerability created by trust in another.”139 Jack Balkin has argued 
 
 133. See, e.g., Batya Friedman & Peter H. Kahn, Jr., Human Values, Ethics, and 
Design, in THE HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION HANDBOOK: FUNDAMENTALS, 
EVOLVING TECHNOLOGIES AND EMERGING APPLICATIONS 1177, 1190 (Julie A. Jacko & 
Andrew Sears eds., 2003) (“[T]rust is said to exist between people who can experience 
good will, extend good will toward others, feel vulnerable, and experience betrayal.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 134. Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1717, 1724 (2006) 
 135. See Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 131, at 431. 
 136. See, e.g., id. at 457. 
 137. Id.; see also Richards & Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap, supra note 131, at 1214.  
 138. See Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 131, at 457. 
 139. Id. (citations omitted). 
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that the notion of fiduciaries is a great fit for modern information 
privacy problems, which arise within relationships that involve power 
and information asymmetries and are characterized by the collection 
or exchange of personal information.140 
Certain body-camera policies already recognize the importance 
of trust by seeking to protect confidential informants. For example, 
Philadelphia’s body-camera policy states that “Body-Worn Cameras 
shall not be used or activated to .	.	. [r]ecord conversations with 
confidential informants and undercover officers.”141 Austin’s policy 
does not require the activation of body cameras when “[a] potential 
witness who requests to speak to an officer [asks for] confidential[ity] 
or desires anonymity” or when “[a] victim or witness .	.	. requests that 
he or she not be recorded as a condition of cooperation and the 
interests of justice require such cooperation.”142 These kinds of 
provisions require or permit confidentiality and discretion in order to 
build trust. 
However, if the laws and policies regulating body camera use are 
to be sustainable, trust must be ensured throughout the lifecycle of 
data, not just at the point of surveillance and capture. This means that 
state actors and verified, accountable third-party vendors that obtain 
body-camera data must be discreet in who the data is disclosed to 
(either as a public record or bulk data exchange), must protect the 
data from leaks to unauthorized third parties by engaging in 
reasonable data security and denitrification, and must be honest with 
those being surveilled and the public at large about when surveillance 
is occurring and their data is being processed. 
Some policies seem to actively state that people cannot trust 
police officers with their personal information. For example, 
Cincinnati’s policy dispels any notion that officers might be discrete 
with surveillance subjects by stating that “[u]nlike the back of a police 
car or empty police interrogation room, which requires notification 
recording equipment is in use, the personal contact between an 
individual and an officer does not constitute an environment where 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.”143 
 
 140. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016) (discussing the concept of information fiduciaries). 
 141. PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 107, at 4. 
 142. AUSTIN POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL: BODY WORN CAMERA SYSTEMS 
§	303.2.5(d) (1–2) (2017), http://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Police/policy_9
-28-17.pdf [http://perma.cc/C4HC-7PLY]. 
 143. CINCINNATI POLICE DEP’T, supra note 112, at 2. 
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Perhaps one of the largest benefits that would come from a focus 
on trust instead of a general expectation of privacy is that it would 
ameliorate the harshness that often results from the application of the 
third-party doctrine, which treats disclosures to anyone, no matter 
how trusted, as a waiver of privacy rights.144 There may be many 
instances in which disclosures to third parties carry no implication of 
or need for trust in a police officer, government, or third party. But, 
the doctrine applies harshly in instances where people make 
themselves vulnerable to officers when they need help, for example, 
when they need to report that they are in an abusive relationship. 
Without the protections of privacy and confidentiality and with a 
camera pointed right on them, victims of abuse might be hesitant to 
report abuse, seek help, or fully confide in others.145 
2.  Obscurity Reveals the Fallacy of “No Privacy in Public” 
Obscurity is the notion that, when information is hard or unlikely 
to be found, it is relatively safe.146 People rely upon this obscurity all 
the time. In work with Evan Selinger and Fred Stutzman, I have 
explored the concept of obscurity as an essential component of 
modern notions of privacy.147 Every day we make decisions about 
where we go, what we do, and what we share based upon how obscure 
we think we are. Most of our information online is obscure as well. 
We use passwords, privacy settings, and disappearing messages to 
make information hard to be found by the wrong audience. Think of 
obscurity as the counterpart to trust. When we can reliably trust 
 
 144. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 140, at 1230 (arguing against the third-party doctrine’s 
assumption that when people disclose information to a third party, the disclosers have “no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information” and proposing, instead, that many 
third parties “owe us fiduciary duties or duties of confidentiality”); Kiel Brennan-
Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORD. L. REV. 611, 611, 616 (2015) (arguing 
that the third-party doctrine should be limited where a person shares information with an 
“information fiduciary”). But see Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009) (defending the third-party doctrine). 
 145. See Fan, supra note 85, at 438–39. 
 146. See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Obscurity: A Better Way To Think About 
Your Data Than ‘Privacy,’ ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2013), http://http://www.theatlantic.com
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/267283 [https://perma.cc/FA9K-B2TQ]. 
 147. See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. 
REV. 385, 388 (2013); Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online 
Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9, 11 (2013) [hereinafter Hartzog & Stutzman, Online 
Obscurity]; Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, Obscurity and Privacy, in ROUTLEDGE 
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 2 (Joseph Pitt & Ashley Shew eds., 
forthcoming 2018). 
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people, we have less of a need to be obscure. However, in contexts 
where there is no one to trust, obscurity becomes invaluable. 
Unlike trust, obscurity is not a widely established concept in law 
or policy. Obscure is defined as “[n]ot readily noticed or seen; 
inconspicuous; .	.	. Not clearly understood or expressed; ambiguous or 
vague.”148 It is a simple concept that involves at least two parties: the 
individual and the observer. “An individual is obscure to an observer 
if the observer does not possess or comprehend critical information 
needed to make sense of the individual.”149 For example, does an 
observer know your personal identity, social connections, or the 
context in which you disclosed something about yourself? Without 
this information, an observer has a limited ability to make sense of 
what you do and what you say. You are just a face in the crowd. 
Finding this information is often costly.150 In the language of privacy 
as obscurity, transaction costs are a good thing. 
When we are obscure, we are protected by an observer’s inability 
to comprehend our actions. We seek to be obscure in our everyday 
lives. We close doors, talk in hushed tones, and take risks of very 
briefly exposing ourselves, comfortable that the odds of adverse 
results are low. Without a sense of obscurity, we would be forced to 
assume that everything we do outside of our homes and physician’s 
offices is going to be observed, stored, or used. People simply do not 
have the resources or ability to protect against that kind of threat 
model. 
Obscurity provides an alternative for those who revolt at the idea 
that there is “no privacy in public.” Many body-camera laws and 
policies are built around the notion that surveillance is “public,” poses 
no privacy threats and is therefore justified.151 For example, the 
Dallas Police Department policy provides that “[w]hile in public 
areas, officers are not required to advise a subject that they are 
recording their interaction unless the subject specifically asks if they 
are being recorded, at which point the officer will inform the subject 
that they are being recorded.”152 The Dallas Police Department’s 
body-camera policy also states that “[o]fficers are not required to 
 
 148. Obscure, THE AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENG. LANGUAGE (5th ed. 
2018), http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=obscure [https://perma.cc/27W5-
5Q8P]. 
 149. Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 147, at 5. 
 150. Id. at 4. 
 151. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §	13.825 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. and First 
Special Sess.) (“[D]ata are public if a subject of the data requests it be made accessible to 
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96 N.C. L. REV. 1257 (2018) 
1292 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
obtain consent from a private person when in a public place or in a 
location where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. It is at 
the discretion of the officer to determine if they want to announce a 
recording is occurring.”153 The Oklahoma City Police Department 
policy states “[e]ach officer shall activate his or her body-worn 
camera in the following circumstances: 1. Voluntary contact (only in a 
public place or a place where the public and the officer have a right to 
be).”154 
The question of what is public, however, is often just a plot on 
the spectrum of things that range from completely obscure to totally 
obvious or known. People’s risk calculus is often built around how 
obscure they are, not whether what they do is theoretically accessible 
by someone.155 Rather, they care whether what they are doing at any 
one particular time and context is likely to be seen, preserved, 
disseminated, or used against them later.156 The calculus for what 
makes things obscure is complex and includes many different factors, 
such as search visibility, permanence, comprehensibility, 
identifiability, and the resources, motivation, and pre-existing 
knowledge of those who seek to surveil or make use of data. These 
factors should be better valued when formulating accounts of what 
public information is or what constitutes being “in public.” 
Additionally, the idea that there is no privacy in public is 
problematic because the notion of “public” is itself an undertheorized 
and amorphous construct. Torts, statutes, and constitutional 
amendments dictate that there can be “no privacy in public 
information.”157 Yet courts, lawmakers, and society have no consistent 
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conceptualization for “public” or “public information.” In everyday 
conversation and even within regulatory schemes, what constitutes 
public information is essentially based on a hunch.158 
Body-camera law could correct this problem by refusing to let 
broad, descriptive notions of “public” dictate legal protection. Up to 
this point, courts have looked to see if society classifies something as 
“public” and shapes the law accordingly. We should flip that 
approach. Designating information as public is not and should not be 
a clinical, empirical judgment, but a normative one meant to shape 
outcomes and serve values. Lawmakers and departments should 
formulate rules aimed at preserving the obscurity of people and their 
data to guide rules for protection. In other work, I have criticized the 
concept of “obscurity lurches,” that is, actions like the use of facial 
recognition technology or making information searchable and easily 
accessible in ways that violate people’s relied upon zones of 
obscurity.159 
The main problem with the reasonable expectations of privacy 
test is not the “reasonableness” approach, which is a foundational 
concept in various areas of the law.160 The problem lies in the concept 
of privacy itself. Even a focus on “reasonable expectations of 
obscurity” might be more useful. A reasonableness approach to 
obscurity would be more focused than the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” standard because it would direct authorities to identify and 
evaluate contextual factors like perceived structural protections, 
threat modeling, and other things that would seem to make the cost of 
finding or understanding information high and, as a result, unlikely to 
occur. In other words, at least the concept of a reasonable expectation 
of obscurity would more directly identify specific factors like signals 
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and transaction costs that can more accurately and consistently define 
a legal threshold. 
3.  Autonomy Justifies Requiring Authorization 
Finally, body-camera rules should serve the autonomy of those 
surveilled. In order to flourish, people need some degree of freedom 
from external control or influence. To many, autonomy is the reason 
privacy is important. This notion is at the heart of the “right to be let 
alone” articulation of privacy developed so many years ago by 
Warren and Brandeis.161 Alan Westin, one of privacy’s most famous 
theorists, wrote that the most significant threat to one’s autonomy is 
the notion that someone might violate one’s “inner zone” to learn 
their deepest secrets.162 Westin wrote, “This deliberate penetration of 
the individual’s protective shell, his psychological armor, would leave 
him naked to ridicule and shame and would put him under the control 
of those who knew his secrets.”163 
Autonomy is at the core of a number of developed theories of 
privacy. Julie Cohen argued, “[a] protected zone of informational 
autonomy is valuable, in short, precisely because it reminds us what 
we cannot measure.”164 Helen Nissenbaum observed that the 
relationship between privacy and autonomy can be thought of in 
three different ways: (1) control over the information itself, (2) 
contributing to an environment where individual autonomy will 
flourish, and (3) as creating space for individuals to follow through on 
autonomous decisions.165 
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One key way to serve people’s autonomy is to give them control 
over when they are surveilled and how their data is processed. 
Control is often given through rules requiring “consent” from 
surveillance and data subjects. An individual’s capacity for self-
determination and freedom from external influence is then respected 
when surveillance and data processing can occur only if the subject 
agrees to it. Prohibiting surveillance without the consent of the 
surveilled respects the agency of those being watched and helps 
mitigate the power disparities inherent in surveillance. 
I have been critical of data protection regimes that make use of 
the concept of “consent” and “control” in the past.166 Too often, the 
limitations of “consent” and “control” regimes are easily exploited by 
those who seek to surveil and process data. People have limited 
resources to process risk and make decisions regarding when they will 
be watched and what is to be done with their personal information. If 
too many requests are made of people, they risk making poor or ill-
informed decisions, and their autonomy is actually reduced, not 
enhanced. When consent regimes are exploited, their main function is 
to burden the data or surveillance subject with the costs and risk of 
harm.167 
However, the infrequency and potential danger of body camera 
surveillance might counsel a prioritization of autonomy in certain 
contexts. Requiring consent at the moment of surveillance can clarify 
exactly what is happening and help individuals determine for 
themselves whether an encounter is to be recorded and stored. 
Additionally, giving surveillance subjects the deletion and other data 
subject rights might be just as beneficial. Governments could borrow 
the wisdom of data protection regimes around the world, which 
embrace the fair information practices.168 These simple data collection 
and processing principles give data subjects meaningful rights such as 
rights of correction and deletion, among others. Given the likely 
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volatile and sensitive nature of body camera recordings and how 
vulnerable people are in police encounters, governments might even 
implement some more robust version of a deletion right, akin to the 
European Union’s “right to be forgotten” or the “sealed” nature of 
certain juvenile records.169 
Of course, consent could still be a problem for body camera 
systems. First, it might not be feasible for an officer to get the consent 
of everyone who will be captured on camera. This is likely why the 
policies of most cities that require consent or permit deactivation 
upon request limit the power of consent sometimes to particular 
individuals like victims or witnesses who wish to make a statement 
and residents of homes.170 Notification requirements might be easier 
to implement as a default rule for everyone better than consent 
requirements, even though these notification regimes widely vary in 
their efficacy.171 
The second problem is that people might feel pressured to give 
consent for surveillance. The “I’ve got nothing to hide” argument 
remains pervasive in both law and society, and the mere act of 
requesting deactivation might cause officers and others to react 
differently to or become suspicious of those who do not want to be 
watched.172 Additionally, what should the policy be in circumstances 
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where some people present at an officer interaction wish for the 
camera to be turned on while others do not? Whose wishes should be 
respected?173 There is no clear answer to these questions. One 
possible strategy would be to give surveillance subjects more robust 
data access, redaction, and deletion rights in the case of conflicting 
requests regarding body-camera deactivation. 
*     *     * 
In sum, body-camera law and policy can largely avoid the 
problems caused by the “reasonable expectations of privacy” 
standard by creating rules built around trust, obscurity, and 
autonomy. There are, of course, other values that body cameras 
should also embrace that are relevant to surveillance and personal 
data. For instance, surveillance and data protection invoke many 
equality issues. People should be protected against targeted use of 
body cameras based upon their race, religious beliefs, sexual 
orientation, or other characteristics. For example, the Austin Police 
Department policy prohibits using body cameras “[t]o monitor 
persons based solely upon the person’s political or religious beliefs or 
upon the exercise of the person’s constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech and religious expression, petition, and assembly under the 
United States Constitution, or because of the content or viewpoint of 
the person’s protected speech.”174 The only way body cameras will be 
safe and sustainable is if they can accommodate all of these values. 
III.  REFINING IMPLEMENTATION: DESIGNING A BETTER BODY 
CAMERA SYSTEM 
In addition to embracing more nuanced notions of privacy, body 
cameras are an opportunity to create a holistic framework that 
addresses both data practices and the design of information 
technologies. In this Part, I make two arguments. First, body-camera 
frameworks should include rules for the design of technologies. 
Design is currently a bit of a blind spot for large areas of privacy 
law.175 Lawmakers and courts outline rules for how information is to 
be collected, used, and shared. But they are often silent on how 
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surveillance and data technologies are actually built and function. 
These rules often do little to address the effect that powerful new 
technologies have on people. For example, surveillance rules often do 
not address the configuration and deployment of surveillance 
technologies. Data protection rules sometimes ignore the default 
settings for consumer-facing technologies or are silent on how far user 
interfaces can go in shaping user expectations of privacy.176 In this 
Part, I argue that the law and policy of body cameras can provide a 
template and momentum for taking design more seriously in privacy 
law generally. 
Second, I propose a model framework for policymakers to 
combine rules for data processing and surveillance as well as the 
design of technologies for a holistic approach to privacy. This 
approach is built around the lifecycle of data collection, storage, 
processing, and disclosure. I propose data and design rules that serve 
the values of trust, obscurity, and autonomy. 
A. Design Will Determine the Value of Body Cameras 
Design choices affect nearly every way in which body cameras 
will be used. Each of these decisions matter. Someone must decide if 
the cameras will collect video, audio, or both. Someone must decide if 
the camera is going to be built and configured to be on by default, or 
if it will be activated manually or automatically. Someone must decide 
if the cameras are to be designed so that the data captured by the 
camera is stored locally or remotely. Authorities must also decide 
whether the data will be decrypted and/or redacted; how it will be 
deleted and when, through what technology and format it will be 
released; and whether redaction technologies will be used to obscure 
the data. 
Design is also power. Biometrics allow more people to be 
surveilled and identified at a fraction of the cost. Alert lights and 
sounds on body cameras can indicate to people when the camera is 
activated. Encryption technologies can protect data against hackers 
and snoops. And technologies designed to redact and blur can 
mitigate the harm from public disclosure of surveillance. 
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Most importantly, design is political. People often say the design 
of technologies can be neutral. “It’s the best available evidence that’s 
neutral,” Steve Tuttle, vice president of communications at camera 
company TASER, told The Wire.177 “It’s just an observer. The truth is 
the truth.”178 Except when it’s not. The design of body cameras is 
never neutral. Every body-worn camera system design decision makes 
a certain reality (and perception of that reality) more or less likely. 
For example, cameras that do not include a blinking “on” light will 
result in less awareness of surveillance than those cameras that by 
design indicate when they are in operation.179 As a result, design 
reflects the prioritization of values by those who control and 
implement systems. When buttons are easy to find and redundancies 
are built in, there will be fewer mistakes turning on and off the 
camera. Whether the camera is designed to be placed on the shoulder, 
on a gun, or even on a drone, affects what is captured and how the 
video will be perceived by the public.180 boyd and Rosenblat wrote, 
Advocates imagine that [body cameras] will surveil the police, 
but unlike most footage that has rallied the public, body-cam 
footage does not make visible the facial expressions or 
movements of the police officer’s body because it doesn’t face 
the officer. Instead, it casts a spotlight on the other people 
among whom police operate. Worse, it focuses attention on the 
limited angles that can be seen from that vantage point. As any 
videographer knows, camera angles matter. You can tell 
radically different stories depending on the angle. For instance, 
due to the average heights of male officers and the women they 
encounter, a lapel camera can capture a steady stream of 
cleavage when an officer is facing her.181 
Even persistent surveillance only captures some of the story. Red 
activation lights on body cameras and systems that allow for 
deactivation upon request show respect for people’s autonomy.182 Use 
of biometrics shows a lack of respect for people’s obscurity because 
they can make things that were previously difficult to find, for 
example your location or identity in a public place, easy to track.183 
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Design is important to get right because it is very difficult to 
change once it is implemented. Governments choose to fund certain 
kinds of systems with certain specifications. Contracts with vendors 
are formed. Officers and employees are trained upon the equipment 
that is decided upon. Policies and rules are built around the 
capabilities of the equipment. This entrenches the design of the 
technologies that are initially chosen and makes changing them 
difficult. As a result, the time to focus on the design of body cameras 
is now, before they become fully entrenched and the rules become set 
in stone.184 
B. Guides for Designing a Body Camera Obscura 
What should design rules for body cameras look like? As an 
initial matter, of course body-camera policies should address more 
than just privacy. Safe, sustainable body-camera laws and policies 
require a careful balancing of sometimes competing interests and 
ethics beyond the scope of this Article.185 Different cities and states 
have different needs, resources, and values. 
Instead, this Part suggests a series of guides, default 
presumptions, and possible boundaries, rights, or systems that could 
be used to create better rules for privacy that also can serve values of 
justice, due process, accountability, and free speech. I use the concept 
of obscurity to develop a guiding ethic for body cameras and privacy: 
To best protect privacy while still retaining the utility of body 
cameras, surveillance and the subsequent data collection, use, and 
dissemination should be “hard but possible” and proportional to 
allowances elsewhere in the system.186 
The best way to follow this ethic and ensure privacy while also 
providing for accountability is to take an accounting of the body 
camera system as a whole, rather than assessing the merit of 
individual privacy protections and surveillance and data process 
allowances in isolation. To do that, we must follow the data. In her 
article on body cameras, Elizabeth Joh ask a series of questions that 
follow the data lifecycle, such as “Who controls the data?” and how 
will it be stored, processed and shared?187 Mateescu, Rosenblat and 
boyd ask questions along the same data lifecycle, such as “When Will 
Cameras Be Running, and How Will Subjects Know?”; “How Long 
 
 184. boyd & Rosenblat, supra note 8. 
 185. Id.; Mateescu et al., supra note 6, at 8. 
 186. Paul Ohm, Good Enough Privacy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 49 (2008). 
 187. Joh, supra note 3, at 133–35. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1257 (2018) 
2018] BODY CAMERAS & PRIVACY LAW 1301 
Will Law Enforcement Agencies Retain Footage, and Who Can See 
It?”, “How Is Footage Secured?”; and “When Can Biometrics Be 
Collected or Used?”188 These questions loosely plot along what some 
conceptualize as the four major stages of a data lifecycle: collection, 
storage, processing, and dissemination. 
These are also the four places where design decisions can support 
more nuanced conceptualizations of privacy such as trust and 
obscurity. Lawmakers and departments should strive to protect 
privacy by ensuring these values are proportionally respected 
throughout a body camera system. If there is a need for more 
surveillance and data processing at the collection point, then perhaps 
more robust obscurity and trust protections could be given to data 
subjects at the storage, processing, and dissemination stage. 
Permissive surveillance rules could dictate more robust redaction and 
deletion rights for data subjects and greater restrictions on access. 
And if the risks of surveillance or data processing are too great to 
compensate for downstream, then those particular acts of surveillance 
or data practices should be prohibited. 
1.  Data Collection 
To protect obscurity, body cameras should, by default, be 
inactive until a set time, condition, or action. If the cameras are set to 
sense and record by default, they will be tools of persistent 
surveillance. Body-camera advocates might have several reasons to 
adopt a persistent surveillance regime. It maximizes the amount of 
camera footage and, thus, the perception of transparency. It might be 
easier for law and policy makers to carve out narrow exemptions 
rather than to articulate narrow activation triggers.189 Persistent 
surveillance regimes also allow police departments to limit officer 
discretion over when to activate and deactivate the cameras. 
However, a default for persistent surveillance also creates a host 
of problems because it is costly to store, curate, redact, and manage 
access to the footage.190 It will inevitably result in less obscurity and 
more exposure, often when people are at their most vulnerable. 
Automated triggers could help solve the problem with officer 
discretion while simultaneously fostering people’s obscurity by 
enacting rules that the cameras are to remain off until activated.191 
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For example, tech companies are experimenting with and marketing 
body camera technologies that automatically activate according to 
certain triggers that might indicate the need for video surveillance, 
such as when a gun is drawn from a holster, when a police cruiser’s 
door is opened or lights and sirens are activated, or when raised 
voices are detected or an officer’s pulse is quickened.192 A built-in 
historical buffer can ensure that the prior few minutes leading up to 
activation are also captured.193 The goal for lawmakers and police 
departments looking to protect privacy should be creating just enough 
data to serve very clearly articulated purposes, such as video evidence 
of the use of force or contentious police encounters, not a general 
surveillance and storage mandate. 
With some imagination, lawmakers and police departments could 
also fashion rules about what kinds of information were collected by 
body-camera sensors upon automated triggers. For example, perhaps 
tiers of risk could be envisioned whereby the mere opening of a 
cruiser’s door or voluntary activation of the camera by the officer 
recorded only audio, whereby sirens, raised voices, and drawn guns 
trigger both audio and high-quality video. Rules that limit recording 
in certain venues such as homes, hospitals, and other places where 
people are undressed or expect discretion would also help establish 
zones of obscurity within which people can feel more protected from 
digital surveillance.194 
Lawmakers who seek to preserve trust between officers and the 
public should also consider mandating obvious warnings to people 
that the camera was on, such as a bright red, blinking recording light 
as well as verbal notice when feasible.195 General prohibitions such as 
Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office mandate that “[body cameras] shall not 
be used surreptitiously” are useful.196 They could be clarified with a 
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design mandate that all body cameras have a clear signal to those 
being surveilled that the camera is operating and recording. This 
notification should be persistent and verbal notification should be a 
requirement where feasible even in “public” spaces.197 
Autonomy rules would vest some control over whether the 
recording was turned on at all (or preserved) in the hands of victims 
and third parties. These rules might include a permission requirement 
and certain retention, deletion, and obscuring rights for surveillance 
and data subjects. Even if full control for surveillance subjects is not 
possible or feasible, policies should give officers some discretion to 
honor requests to turn off body cameras.198 In sum, body camera data 
collection should be obvious, sparse, as obfuscated to the extent 
feasible, and possible for victims and third parties to control. 
2.  Data Storage 
To store data is to create a privacy risk.199 Data is searchable and 
persistent. It never deteriorates, unlike our memory, which naturally 
obscures information and contexts. Stored data is also hackable. 
Lawmakers should require that police departments and any third-
party vendors take all reasonable measures to secure body-camera 
data. Given the sensitivity of this information, this standard expects a 
fair bit from departments and vendors. 
Thankfully, lawmakers do not need to come up with a robust set 
of data protection practices from scratch. They simply need to ensure 
that departments and vendors adhere to the same full set of principles 
for ideal data stewardship as those in industry who collect and process 
personal information. This means articulating rules around data and 
risk identification; the necessary technical, physical, and 
administrative safeguards for personal information; and breach 
response plans. This might include mandated obscurity, data 
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protection, and security impact assessments of particular policies and 
design choices, mandated encryption, and other de-identification and 
access controls such as hashing, salting, and “scrubbing” data.200 It 
also might include rules about ensuring the security of data in transit 
from the camera to the cloud storage, or perhaps even a local storage 
on the camera with specific transfer times and mechanisms that do 
not require the camera itself to be connected to the internet. 
Perhaps just as importantly in terms of storage, lawmakers 
should mandate regular deletion as well as give data subjects deletion 
rights. These are not easy lines to draw. Mateescu, Rosenblat, and 
boyd note that there is no generally agreed upon time or formula to 
determine how long footage is to be kept.201 They note that there are 
many factors to be considered, including the cost of retention, what 
types of footage to keep and flag for review, how long to keep footage 
that has value in investigations or as evidence, the risk of retained 
footage being misused for unconstitutional or harmful surveillance, 
and the risk “that footage can be analyzed to divergent purposes, with 
differing and prescribed rules for access, review, and analysis.”202 Joh 
wrote, “[t]he few states that have addressed body-worn camera video 
storage limits have generally erred on the side of limiting video 
storage unless it is involved in a criminal investigation.”203 She notes 
that the tradeoff is difficult because there are several advantages to 
longer storage times:204 
Shorter storage times means there is less data (of the innocent 
as well as the guilty) available for inspection and analysis. Yet 
longer data storage periods may enhance public accountability 
if it means that the public—citizens, journalists, and 
researchers—can access video that can illuminate individual 
cases as well as general policing practices.205 
But these lines mandating deletion after a certain time and upon 
certain requests must be drawn. The alternative is persistent 
retention, which is a risk to people’s obscurity and autonomy. While it 
is costly to create a system to protect and scrub data, flag certain data 
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for retention, and delete the rest, this is a minimum price for the safe 
implementation of body cameras. 
3.  Data Processing 
Data can be processed in ways that destroy obscurity and erode 
people’s trust and autonomy. Industry already processes data and 
uses algorithms in inscrutable and dangerous ways.206 As a starting 
matter, governments and departments that are particularly committed 
to privacy might even consider adopting some of the framework of 
the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation for 
data.207 This framework prohibits data processing without a legitimate 
reason.208 Academics and governments have written volumes on the 
virtues of a data protection framework.209 This Article merely 
proposes it as an established guide for the development of fair data 
processing rules, with a preference for design restrictions instead of 
consent of the data subject as a legitimatization lever. 
However, protecting obscurity and trust might require more. 
Lawmakers should create rules to prevent obscurity lurches like the 
use of biometrics and disloyal repurposing of data. Biometrics are a 
particular area of concern for body cameras. The Police Executive 
Research Forum (“PERF”) report states that “Body-worn cameras 
raise many privacy issues that have not been considered before. 
Unlike many traditional surveillance methods, body-worn cameras 
can simultaneously record both audio and video and capture close-up 
images that allow for the potential use of facial recognition 
technology.”210 The Leadership Conference argued that “[b]iometric 
evaluation of footage must be strictly limited to narrow, well-defined 
uses, and subject to judicial authorization.”211 I agree. Facial 
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recognition should be an exceptional event. Biometrics allow for 
dramatic lurches in obscurity. Elsewhere, I have explored with Evan 
Selinger about why facial recognition is a corrosive menace to our 
cherished obscurity.212 We argued that people don’t have the 
expectation they will be practically monitored everywhere they go, 
nor do they have the ability to fully embrace paranoid risk-
management strategies to hide from surveillance.213 Rather, we have 
always been able to “hide in plain sight.”214 We argue that 
“[u]biquitous and unrestrained facial recognition technologies 
wouldn’t just alter this longstanding presumption, it would shatter it 
entirely.”215 
Lawmakers should either prohibit the use of facial recognition 
technologies outright or subject them to procedural protections like 
mandatory privacy impact assessments before implementation and 
judicial authorization before use. Additionally, lawmakers should 
limit the reuse of data collected by body cameras for other facial 
recognition programs. As I have written elsewhere with Evan 
Selinger, the full potential of facial-matching technologies requires a 
comprehensive name-face database to compare with current 
surveillance images.216 
There will likely be a great incentive or demand for police 
departments to share the data and biometrics databases with others. 
But if we value autonomy and obscurity and all the benefits of 
freedom from surveillance, lawmakers should create rules against the 
use of body-camera data for facial recognition. 
Additionally, lawmakers should establish rigid rules limiting or 
prohibiting the reuse of data collected by body cameras. One of the 
key tenets of fair information process is what some call “purpose 
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two parts: the first, often referred to as “purpose specification,” holds 
that “data must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes only,” and the second, often referred to as “compatible 
use,” holds that “data must not be further processed in a way that is 
incompatible with those purposes.”218 In essence, data collected for 
one very specific purpose cannot and should not be used for another 
incompatible purpose. This is a key data ethic that underlies many 
international data protection regimes, including Europe’s General 
Data Protection Regulation.219 
Given the sensitive nature of the information collected by body 
cameras, mere purpose limitations might not be enough. In previous 
research, I have argued with Neil Richards that part of the duty of 
trust includes a duty of loyalty—a data processor’s obligation to avoid 
self-dealing at the expense of those who trust them.220 We wrote that 
many of our fears about big data are really fears about organizations 
being disloyal to us and using information in ways adverse to us.221 
Will big data analytics deny us meaningful opportunities such as 
mortgages or jobs?222 Will big data redlining have a disparate impact 
on minority and marginalized populations?223 
Lawmakers should prohibit departments and vendors from 
reusing information not just in ways incompatible with the purpose 
specified for collection, but also in disloyal ways. This means limiting 
those who can access data and making governments and third-party 
vendors promise not to engage in self-dealing. One way to prevent 
the incentive to reuse information in disloyal ways is to ensure that 
governments pay for vendor services with money, not data. As we 
have seen, the dominant business model on the web in which 
technology companies offer free services in exchange for personal 
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information, is a model for exploitation.224 Elizabeth Joh has 
chronicled the corrosive influence that body-camera vendors have 
over body-camera policy.225 Lawmakers must create rules to counter 
the power incentives for department and vendor exploitation. 
4.  Data Dissemination 
Finally, lawmakers and courts must determine when data is 
disclosed and to whom. There are many possible considerations 
regarding the release of body-camera data. Answering them will 
involve confronting the traditional journalistic aspects of a story: Who 
can access the data? What can they access? When and where can they 
access the data? And how can they access the data? 
Instead of binary rules that either keep information locked up or 
release to the public for any and all uses, it might be best to use the 
relative obscurity and confidentiality of information as a slider to 
determine the extent to which information is protected and released. 
Some parties might have more access than others based on their need 
for information. Other kinds of data might be less sensitive or better 
obscured, for example with faces or sound blurred out or the entire 
screen blurred with a filter. 
In confronting the many different factors relevant to disclosure, 
lawmakers might consider adopting rules that leverage promises of 
trust through contracts and rules that limit things like commercial use 
of body cameras or attempts at re-identification. Lawmakers might 
also consider innovative redaction, blurring, video-only, audio-only, 
and other redaction techniques. The goal of a safe disclosure regime 
is to tailor the disclosure to the need to serve the multiple values of 
privacy, due process, and government accountability. 
As an initial matter, body-camera policies can probably better 
balance privacy with other values by differentiating who is allowed to 
access the records. Many policies already reflect this differentiation.226 
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Putting aside important questions over access to evidence, in order to 
protect their autonomy, those who have been surveilled should be 
guaranteed access or at least a presumption of access to body camera 
data. Some policies already provide this. For example, the Newark 
Police Department has a policy to tag recordings that raise privacy 
concerns and limit access to those tagged recordings.227 
One important problem to protect against is officers accessing 
records for retaliation purposes or just general snooping. This can be 
a violation of trust, obscurity, and autonomy. The ACLU has 
advocated that “[t]he use of recordings should be allowed only in 
internal and external investigations of misconduct, and where the 
police have reasonable suspicion that a recording contains evidence of 
a crime.”228 “Otherwise,” according to the organization, “there is no 
reason that stored footage should even be reviewed by a human being 
before its retention period ends and it is permanently deleted.”229 
Snooping in entrusted and generally inaccessible information is 
disloyal and serves the interests of the voyeur only. Provisions should 
be put in place to prohibit it.230 
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Finally, lawmakers must seek to facilitate public disclosure of 
body-camera data in a safe, sustainable way. Public records law is the 
primary vehicle for dissemination of government information and 
facilitation of government transparency. Mateescu, Rosenblat, and 
boyd write that “[p]ublic records laws are intended to grant citizens 
access to government records. This raises a question of whether body-
worn camera video is a public record, and if so, whether it may or 
must be disclosed.”231 Each state has different rules about which 
records are to be made public and which are to be withheld under 
certain exceptions for things like privacy, trade secrets, and ongoing 
investigations. 
Mateescu, Rosenblat, and boyd summed up the different views 
on public disclosure of body camera footage and data: 
According to the ACLU, policymakers must “carefully 
balance,” “the need for government oversight and openness, 
and privacy,” when creating policies about public disclosure. To 
do that, it suggests flagging those videos “for which there is the 
highest likelihood of misconduct” and redacting video “when 
feasible” and asserts that unredacted video should only be 
publicly disclosed with the consent of the subject. However, 
redacted video and unredacted flagged video should be subject 
to disclosure, and according to the Leadership Conference, 
redacted footage should be made available for non-commercial 
public interest purposes, with the right protections for witnesses 
and victims. PERF suggests that agencies should have clear 
protocols for releasing recorded data to the public, consistent 
with public disclosure laws.232 
Regarding what kinds of data parties can access, certain policies 
limit the public disclosure of information that is “private” or vaguely 
“confidential.” The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department has a 
policy that limits disclosure if “[t]he recording contains information 
that is otherwise confidential or exempt from disclosure or release 
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under State or federal law.”233 But these terms could use some 
clarification. We’ve already discussed how the term privacy is not 
helpful. When policies use the term “private,” do they mean 
confidential? Obscure? 
If they do mean confidential, the policy should clarify that it is 
the data subject’s confidence that is to be kept, not a general wish for 
secrecy that could mask a desire to protect against embarrassment. 
Some examples would also be helpful besides simply “social security 
numbers,” like the vague policy of the Columbus Police Department 
which provides “[r]eleased video/audio footage will not contain any 
confidential information such as social security numbers, personal 
information about police officers, etc. unless expressly requested and 
approved by the Chief of Police and the prosecuting attorney.”234 
Confidence is ultimately determined by the terms of a relationship 
and disclosure, even if the sensitive nature of information might affect 
whether an implied confidence exists. 
If the policy is meant to protect obscurity, then it should provide 
a framework for determining the relative obscurity of information. I 
have written in the past that obscurity is a combination of factors 
including structural protections, cultural norms, and the desirability of 
information by other parties.235 Online, obscurity is a product of lack 
of searchability, limited access, de-identification, and opacity of 
meaning.236 The more people rely upon being obscure, the greater 
protections that might apply. 
Access need not be granted on an all-or-nothing basis. 
Information can be blurred and redacted to obscure sensitive aspects 
of information while providing the public access to important 
records.237 Seattle has taken the innovative step of releasing blurred 
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and obscured body camera data on YouTube.238 The data need not be 
made available by default, either. Lawmakers might experiment with 
releasing some information in limited formats, such as at a terminal in 
person but not in an easily sharable digital format. 
Finally, lawmakers might condition public access on a few 
important rules. If the information has been redacted or de-identified, 
lawmakers could prohibit attempts at re-identification through 
technological means. Additionally, lawmakers might consider rules 
that mitigate the problem of commercial entities clogging the public 
records system with requests for records they can monetize in bulk.239 
While lawmakers might consider prohibiting some kinds of egregious 
bulk commercial uses of body camera data, Margaret Kwoka has 
suggested the answer to the commercial public records problem is to 
affirmatively disclose the kinds of records that are subject to routine 
public records problems.240 It remains to be seen which actors will 
make the most requests for body camera data. But it is clear that 
lawmakers must try to carefully balance interests of access with 
obscurity and autonomy interests. 
CONCLUSION 
If lawmakers keep applying the same privacy frameworks to the 
rules for body cameras, they will get what they’ve always gotten: an 
inconsistent set of rules that do not seem to match people’s actual 
expectations of privacy and actually seem to facilitate the slow creep 
toward more surveillance. It is hard to balance privacy with other 
critical interests such as government accountability and free speech 
when privacy is poorly defined. Privacy law has a blind spot when 
lawmakers only focus more on when surveillance is conducted and 
what people do with data and less on how data and surveillance 
technologies are built. Body cameras are an opportunity to change 
that. Or give us more of the same. 
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